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CHAPl'ER I
INTRODUCTION
Human freedom or the lack of it is a subject of great interest.
Socially and politically the quest for freedom has highlighted our
news for years.

Freedom marches may gain some measure of social

equality for oppressed minorities, independence granted to subject
nations may mark the advent of political freedom, but still the search
for freedom wil.1 go on.

New moralities may be promulgated, new

liberties expressed in fashions, nevertheless man's hunger for freedom
will not be satisfied.
business and big labor.

We live in an age of collectivism, of big
In this time the "solitary individual" is·

seeking identity and meaning for life.

For this reason and to this

end man thirsts for freedom.
Ultimately freedom is a spiritual concept.

Our Lord said, "If

you continue in my word, you are truly my disciples, and you will
know the truth and the truth will make you free."

1

Saint Paul under-

scores the freedom that comes to the follower of Christ in the words,
"There is therefore now no condemnation for those who are in Christ
Jesus.

For the law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus has set me

free from the law of sin and death . "

2

This freedom is of a different

nature from the freedom so ardently sought at'ter today, but ultimately

1John 8:3lb, 32. R.s.v.
2Romans 8:1,2.

R.S.V~

2

all true and lasting freedom is grounded in this freedom.
Such an assertion needs authentication.
this paper.

This is the purpose of

This study will focus on the concept of "free will" as

it is fornrulated in the Lutheran Confessions and expressed by
S~ren Kierkegaard in selected writings • .
We make this comparison in the light of recent developments in
Protestant theology.

This new movement has been called "Neo-Orthodoxy"

or "crisis" theology and has received much of its impetus from the
writings of Karl Barth.

Many acknowledge that Kierkegaard is ultimately

the spiritual "father" of this theology.
the source of existentialism.

Kierkegaard is also cited as

Smith asserts: "There can be no doubt that

the ultimate source of existentialism, especially in its religious and

t13

theological aspect, is S~ren Kierkegaard (1813-1855) •

Since Kierkegaard was a Danish Lutheran one might logically expect
to find affinities between his thought and that of our Lutheran
Confessions.

But since the Lutheran Confessions were available long

before Kierkegaard why has he had such an impact on modern theological
thought?

Is Kierkegaard's theology different or is it expr~~~ed

differently? These questions .pose the. r~ason for this study~
..

~

... •

•'

J

•

The Scope of this Study
This · paper will attempt to survey and examine the concept of free
. ··:

will in the Lutheran Confessions and in selected Kierkegaard writings.

3John E. Smith and Others, A Handbook of Christian Theology (New
York: Meridian Books, Inc., 1958), pp. 120, 121.
. ..

3
Ancillary categories such as original sin will likewise have to be
explored so that free will is seen in its true perspective.

Faith

will receive brief treatment to show the subordinate position of the
concept of free wi11 in both the Lutheran Confessions and in Kierkegaard.
Wherever equitable similar categories will be used to examine the
position of the Lutheran Confessions and of S~ren Kierkegaard.

Since

this cannot be done completely, the first category considered in
examining each position will be the point of view.
A limiting factor in this study are the resources available to
this writer.
this paper:

The fo11owing works will serve as basic resources for
The Book of Concord edited

by

Theodore G. Tappert_will

be the basis for the study in the Confessions.

Schlink's Theology of

the Lutheran Confessions will also be used in the Confessional segment
of this paper.

In examining Kierkegaard's works, The Concept of Dread

and The Sickness unto Death are cited mo~t frequently •. In interpreting
Kierkegaard's ~osition Thomte's Kierkegaard'' s Philosophy of Religion
and Heinecken's The Moment Before God play the most prominent ·role
although other works are cited.

For purposes of general ·overview and

perspective. Pelikan's From Luther to Kierkegaard and Martin's ·The Wings
of Faith have been used.
The Method of this Study
Our approach to the concept of free will in the Confessions and
selected Kierk~gaard writings will be first to examine the positions.
A brief attempt will be made to understand the position taken in.the

4

light of the historical. context.

Hence introductory background material. ·1

will be cited to establish the circumstances pertinent to the position
taken by either the Lutheran Confessions or Kierkegaard.
Following the examination of each position an attempt will be made
at comparison.

Similarities and differences will be noted.

The signi-

ficance of the similarities as well as the differences will be the subject
of the final chapters of this study.
I know of no other study in this area, but this does not mean that
such studies do not exist.

If parallel studies are available at the

Seminary library, they should be read as a control on this paper.
The Objectives of this Study
The primary objective of this paper irlll be the comparison of the
Lutheran Confessional position on human freedom with the position of
S~ren Kierkegaard.
differences

may

In the light of the comparison similarities and

be brought out for evaluation.

The deeper appreciation

of the Lutheran Confessional position with regard to free will as well
as Kierkegaard's position should result from this study.
There ought to be some b~-products of this study.

Perhaps a better

grasp of the direction of modern Protestant theology might be one.
Hopefully, there will be some implications for systematic theology as a
result of this survey.

Perhaps there

may be

even a suggestion for

improving the Seminary curriculum in systematic theology.
Finally, we will discover the answer to the question mentioned
previously:

Is Kierkegaard's theology different or does he express it

5
differently?

From the answer we receive we might be moved to examine

current Lutheran theological fonnulations.

We might even be challenged

to utilize a different methodology for expressing theological convictions.
A Personal Reason for this Study
I must here acknowledge

my

theo~ogy back to life for me.

debt to S~ren Kierkegaard who brought
The arid deserts of Aristotelian categories

in which our systematic theology was framed had nearly convinced me that
theology was merely a matter of comprehending and applying certain formulae.
It was and is Kierkegaard's gi~ to me that he led me to see Christianiiy
in terms of existence.

In his own dynamic way he demonstrated to me

that theology included the "how" of life as well. as the "what" of l.ife.
Thus thi.s pilgrimage into· the Lutheran Confessions and Kierkegaard was
.

.

for me both necessary and rewarding.

CHAPl'ER Il

FREE WILL Ii"i THE LUTHERAN CONFESSIONS
Man, the Creature
So it is not irreligious, idle, or superfluous, but in the
highest degree wholesome and necessary, for a Christian to
know whether or not his will has anything to do in matters
~ertaining to salvation. Indeed, let me tell you, this is
the hinge on which our discussion turns, the crucial issue
between us; our aim is, simply, to investigate what ability
'free-will' has, in what respect it is the subject of
Divine action and how it stands related to the grace of God.
If we know nothing of these things, we shall know nothing
whatsoever of Christianity, and shall be in worse case than
any people on earth. 1
So wrote Luther to Erasmus, and these ·words seem a fitting
introduction to our examination of the concept of free will in the
Confessions of' our church.

Furthermore, Luther's statement underlines

the crucial importance of this area of' thought for theology.

In

order to appraise the Confessional position fairly, we turn first to the
point of view under the theme: "Man, the Creature."
As we look at our Confessional anthropology we note that man is
understood on the basis of Scripture.
than human.

The perspective is Divine rather

Thus Dr. Pelikan writes:

The fundamental category in the Biblical doctrine of' man is
the category "creature." Whatever else Christian theology
'I!'zy have to sa:y about the nature and destiny of man, it says
in the limits described by that category. Its picture of'
man as a sinner, therefore, must portray him as a fallen
creature. It must not make him a creature of Satan because

lv.iartin Luther, The Bondage of' the Will, translated by J. I~ Packer
and O. R. Johnston (Westward, N.J.: Fleming H. Revell. Co., 1957), p. 78.

7
of his sin. Nor dare theology forget that it is precisely ma.n's creaturely derivation from God that makes
his sin so calamitous.
Seeking
as they do to declare the orthodox Christian
•
I
faith on the basis of the Sacred Scriptures, the Lutheran
Confessions articulate their d~ctrine of man within this
fundamental Biblical category.
The understanding of man as a creature is not an attempt to debase
man but an effort to ground human dignity in God, the creator.

Man's

true dignity is not to be found in any achievement or goodness on man's
part, but in the basic truth that God created him and still. preserves
him even af'ter the fall.

To confess "I believe that God has created

me" means that I em God's creature even in the state of

my

sin.

Schlink writes:
At the same time it becomes clear that we believe in God
not only as the creator of man in general, but of the
concrete individual person. No function of man is expected.
Indeed, the long list of things in which man is the creature
of God--the list which Luther compiled and to which we could
add--is expressly lef't unfinished when it is stated "that
none of us has his life of himself, or anything that has
here been mentioned or can be mentioned, nor can he by
himself preserve any' of them, however small and unimportant"
(L·. C. 11,16). Did God, then create sinful man? No. But
man even in sin and in spite of sin is altogether God's
creature.3
Regardless of our spiritual capabilities or religious attainments
or the lack of them, our relationship to God is one of creature to

2Jaroslav Pelikan, "The Doctrine of Creation in Lutheran Confessional.
Theology," Concordia Theological Monthly, XXVI, No. 8, (August 1955),

569-579.

.

~dmund Schlink, Theology of the Lutheran Confessions, translated
by Paul F. Koehneke and Herbert J. A. Bouman (Philadelphia: Muhlenberg
Press, 1961), pp. 39a4o. Hereaf'ter Schlink's work will be referred to
as Schlink, Theology.

,.
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Creator.
of man.

This fact is never lost sight of in the Confession's view
Of'ten this is more implicit than explicit,· for aside from

Luther's explanations to the first article of the Apostles' Creed in
both Catechisms no separate article is devoted to it.
The Flacian controversies did serve to point up the necessity of
ma.king a distinction between man's creatureliness and his corruption.
Hence the Formula of Concord reaffirms in no uncertain terms man's
creature-creator relationship to God.
even af'ter the Fall God is man's creator who creates body
and soul for him. Therefore the corrupted man cannot be
identified unqualifiedly with sin itself, for in that
case God would be the creator of sin ••••• It is of
course true that this creature and handiwork of God has
been miserably corrupted by sin, for the dough out of
which God forms and makes man has been corrupted and perverted
in Adam and is transmitted to us in this condition. At this
point all Christian hearts may well ponder God's inexpressible
· kindness in that he does not immediately cast this corrupted,
perverted and sinful dough into hell-fire, but out of it he
makes and fashions our present human nature, which is so
miserably corrupted by sin, in order that through his beloved
Son he might clegnse it from sin, sanctity it, and save it
(F.C. I, 38,39).
·
The love of God is abundantly evident in the Creator-creature
relationship.

This love which has created and sustai~s human life is .

undeserved and unmerited.

In explaining the first Article of.the

Apostles' Creed Luther str~ssed God's goodness and mercy in providing
for our human needs.

Schlink observes: "In this connection it is

4.rh.e Book of Concord: The Confessions of" the Evangelical Lutheran
Church, translated and edited by Theodore G. Tappert in collaboration
with Jaroslav Pelikan, Robert H. Fischer, and Arthur C. Piepkorn
(Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1959), PP• 514, 515. Hereaf'ter ~
Book of Concord will be referred to as la£•

9

striking that with all this emphasis on the unmerited character of
this love the term 'grace' is not used."

He al.so notes that the

Lutheran Confessions nowhere speak o:f a "grace o:f creation" that
-would correspond to the "grace o:f :forgiveness. 11 5
At the outset we must recognize the Confession's emphasis on

"Man, the Creature," the recipient o:f God's goodness in both creation
and preservatio~.

We must recognize al.so the distinction between

man's creatureliness which is God's workmanship and man's corruption
which is Satan's workmanship.

In :fact, the Creator-creature relation-

ship shapes the line o:f responsibility between man and God.

Luther

pointea out our response in this relationship very simply in the
-words: "For all .o f this I am bound to thank, praise, serve and obey
him. 116
In the Large Catechism Luther asserts that we haven't responded
to God's goodness and mercy as we ought.
Therefore, this article -would humble and terrify us all. if
we believed it. For we sin daily with eyes and ears, hands,
body and soul, money and property, and with all that we have.
This is especially true o:f those who even fight against the
Word o:f God. Yet Christians have this advantage, that they
acknowledge themselves in duty bound o serve and obey him
:for all these things (L.C. II, 2,22).

1

To the cause :for our :failure to respond we now turn.

5schlink, Theology, p. 40.
~ ' p.

345.

7Ibid., p. 413.

10

Man, the Fallen Creature
It is no accident that in the Formula of Concord the article on
Free Will follows the article on Original Sin.
been conditioned by the Fall.
a fallen creature.

The will of

man

has

Man is not only a creature, he is now

His will is now diseased, . unable to establish a

healthy relationship with God.
Our churches also teach that since the fall of Adam all
men who are propagated according to nature are born in sin.
That is to say, they are without fear of God, are without
trust in God and are concupiscent. And this disease or vice
of origin is truly sin, which even now damns 'and brings
eternal death on those who are not born aga~n through
Baptism and the Holy Spirit (A.C. I.I, 1,2).
.
Both the Fall and the "Imago Dei 11 are considered in the Confessions
.under the subject of 110riginal Sin." And although we might wish these
subjects had received separate treatment, they are given their proper
relationship to man, who in the Confessions is always viewed as a
whole.

Man is one, and yet conflict rages within man.

Man is a creature

of God and yet man is a sinner estranged from God.
Man in .this time is therefore, on the one hand, a creature
and, on the other, a sinner; a creature in his whole nature
of body and soul, and 11 thoroughly and entirely poisoned and
corrupted" in the sight of God as by "a spiritual leprosy"
(s.D: I, 6). Every day his reason is given to him by his
Creator, and yet it is corrupt through_and through; given to
him by God, and yet unable to decide in favor of the good.
Daily God gives man life, and yet as a . sinner he is d~~d~ ..
Thus man. as a creature receives di~e· love, while as ~ sinne:r;-. he is under the . wrath of God •.

8Ibid., · p. 29.
9schlink, Theology, p. 44, 45.

ll

Here we catch a glimpse of the dialectical tension involved in
being a ":fallen creature" of God.

The fall involves us as human

beings in the loss of the Ima.go Dei and yet we remain God's creatures.
The Confessions make no attempt to psychologize or ~xplain the fall..
It is simply termed "Adam's disobedience." The result is a loss of
God's image and involvement in "Original Sin. 11
To "Fall" one has to fall from something to something.

That from

which man has "fallen" is termed in our Confessions, "the image of
God."

Man

has lost the image of God.

This image is now defaced.

The

Confessions equate this image with the original concreated righteousness of paradise which included truth, holiness, and righteousness.

The

loss of the "image of God" is also termed "original sin."
Furthermore, that original sin is the complete lack or
absence of the original concreated righteousness, or of
the image of God according to which man was originally
created in truth, holiness, and righteousness, together
with a disability and ineptitude as far as the things
of God are concerned (F.C. I, 10). 1 0
·

In view of the Confessions original righteousness or the image
of God involved "a balanced physical constitution" together with a
"balanced spiritual constitution" that included "knowledge of God,
:fear of God, trust in God, or at least the inclination and power to
do these things."11 The Confessions cite Genesis 1:27 as the biblical
base for this position and interpret the "image of God" to mean the

1

°1£,

p. 510.

llschlink, Theology, p.

47.

12
gifts of the knowledge of God, fear of God and trust in God.

It is

only in regeneration by the Holy Spirit that fallen man is "changed into
His likeness" which is interpreted as a restoration of the true knowledge
of God.

The Confessions accept the traditional position regarding man's

state of integrity prior to the fall.

Schlink observes:

The concept 'original. sin' clearly presupposes and includes
the fact of the fall and of man's original state, but this
presupposition is not further explained, and statements
about the pristine state and the manner of the fall are
scanty.12
This preliminary exploration of the Confessional concepts of
the Fall and the Ima.go Dei will suffice to introduce us to a consideration of the concept of original sin.
Original Sin
The Confessional doctrine of original sin could claim connection'
with historic Christian doctrine as expressed by Tertullian and
13
Augustine.
In the Apology Melanchthon reviews Augustine's definition of "concupiscence" before sunnning up ·w ith this statement:
In our definition of original sin, therefore, we h~ve
correctly expressed both elements: lack of ability to
trust, fear or love God; and concupiscence, which pursues
carnal ends contrary to the word of God (that is, not only
the desires of the body but also carnal 'Wisdom and righteousness in which it trusts while it despises God) (Ap. ll,
26) .14

12Ibid., p. 41.

1 ~illard Dow Allbeck, Studies in the Lutheran Confessions
(Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1952), p. 62. Hereafter Al.lbeck's
work will be referred to as Allbeck, Studies.
1 ~ , p. 103.

13
Schlink has collated the Confessional references to the doctrine of
original sin in masterly fashion, and for the sake of convenience and
brevity we will follow his collation.
as a sinner is 'without fear of God, • • • without trust
in God, and • • • concupiscent' (A.C. II, 1). This lack of
the fear of God and of trust in God is by no means merely a
deficiency, but it is the reality of the creature's active
rebellion against the Creator, "hating his judgment and
fleeing it, being angry at him, despairing of his grace,
trusting in temporal things, etc."--'fleeing God as a tyrant,
hating and grumbling against his will; again, not daring to
entrust ourselves to God's goodness, but rather always
putting more reliance on money, property, and friends'
{Ap. II, 8).15

Man

In the Augsburg Confession the Gennan version reads "evil desire
and inclination" for "concupiscence" which means "the perversity which
loves the evil rather than the good."

16

Schlink, quoting the Confessions,

expands on this explanation of concupiscence in the following fashion:
The reality of the enmity against God is again, .not mere~
a sinful deed, but it is sinful craving, lust and desire.
"When we use the term 'concupiscence," we do not mean only
its acts or fruits but the continual inclination or
nature" {Ap. II, 3). Concupiscence is a corruption of the
physical constitution and also 'an evil lust and inclination,
according to which we, in spite of the best and highest
faculities {sic) and the light of reason, nevertheless are
carna~ inclined and minded against God' (Ap. II, 25).17
Concupiscence is a loaded term, packing the freight of man's
enmity and hostility toward God.
from which actual sin is fired.

1 5schli~, Theologi, p. 40.

16Allb~ck, Studies, p. 63.
17schlink, Theology, p. 40.

In a sense, it is the loaded gun

14
Men are sinners, such as 11are full of evil lusts and
inclinations from their mothers' ·wombs and are unable
by nature to have true fear of God and true faith in
God 11 (A.C. II, 1). Sin is not merely the reality of
individual deeds, but of all thoughts, words and
deeds of man, both of the evil as well as of the socalled good ones.
Thus 'man sins truly even when he performs noble,
beautiful, and precious deeds, such as the world
values highly' (Ap. 14, 33). Sin is not merely the
deed of individual people, but it is a reality for
all men. "Here no one is godly11 (s.A. III, iii, 3). 1 8
From this and countless references of similar nature we can
conclude that sin is the condition in which we exist from the moment
of our birth.

By nature man is unable to truly fear and trust God.

Sin is the inescapable prison of every

man

born of woman.

Sin is

real because original sin is real. and only the virgin-born Son of
God is excluded from the verdict that al.l men are conceived and born
in sin. 19

Sin not only affects us individually, but it pervades our
corporate lives.

11

The community of all men, of all their deeds,

and of all their inclination is, ever since Adam's fal.l, the community
.

in sin.

..20

The Confessions heap up analogous phrases seeking to express the
nature of original sin.

18Ibid., p. 41.

19Ibid.
20Ib.d

--1;_·' p.

43.

15
Accordingly, original sin is a "deep • • • corruption of .
nature" (S.A. III,i,3), 'the rapidly spreading hereditary
plague' (Ap. II 8) the "abominable and dreadful inherited
disease which h~s ~orruoted our entire nature" (S.D. 8,21),
by no means only a partial corruption, but a "deep, wicked,.
abominable, bottomless, inscrutable, and inexpressible
corruption of his entire nature in all its powers,
especially of the highest and foremost2fowers of the soul
in mind, heart, and will" (S.D. I,ll).
In view of this, it is impossible to view sin only as an act.
Original sin is not something we do, but a blight on our very
existence:
it inheres in the nature, substance, and essence of man
in such a way that even if no evil thought would ever arise
in the heart of corrupted man, no idle word were spoken,
or no wicked act or deed took place, nevertheless man's
nature is corrupted through original sin (Ep. 1,21), and
"his nature and person" are as with "a spiritual leprosy
• • • thoroughly and entirely poisoned and corrupted"
(S.D. I,6). Nothing in man is excepted from this corruption, neither in his body nor in his soul, neither in his
deeds nor in his thoughts or inclinations. "The fruits
of this sin are all the subsequent evil deeds which are
forbidden in the Ten Commandments" (S.A. ~II,i,2).22
The natural man will object to this understanding of man by
pointing out that he has no choice but to sin if this view of man
is true.

And if he has no choice, how then can God hold him responsible1

Werner Elert discusses this very point in the first chapter o f ~
Structure of Lutheranism under the term Urerlebnis.

-

21Ibid.
22Ibid., pp. 43, 44.
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In this situation it is natural to look first at man.
One tries to explain this dread (of God) to oneself
psychologically. But under the eyes of God man comes
to an altogether different conclusion. For he is
totally in the grip of a power outside and therefore
opposed to him. And indeed in a twofold sense. For
one thing, God demands of him an accounting. God
holds him· responsible. The fact that God holds him
responsible shows him conclusively that he actually had
an obligation to be something, to do s omething, or to
leave something undone. But now the terrible discovery.•
God holds him responsible for something he can never
accomolish. The reason is that for the t'ul.fillment of
the g~eat "Thou shalt" which hangs over his whole life
he lacks the first and important thing--free will. His
will is in bondage. Only when man can no longer be in
doubt as to the mysterious power that binds him unconditionally and therefore keeps him from doing what he
should does this knowledge become terrible in full
measure. It 1s God Himself. This is the second sense in
which God has power over him. God makes demands of man.
and, in spite of this, brings about the very opposite in
him. As if in mockery, however, He holds him responsible
for nont'ul.fillment. Man should do what is good, but he
must do what is evil. We know why Luther is filled with
dread. Now we know the connection between death and God.
Furthermore, -,,,e know that this death is something different from the .outer end. It is the end of the "moral
person. 1123
To this point we now turn in the Confessions, namely that although
fallen man cannot but sin, he is still responsible before God and his
sin incurs guilt.
Even though fallen man cannot but sin, this sin is guilt,
nevertheless; "is truly sin"--sin which condemns "to the·
eternal wrath of God" (A.C. II,2). Even though sin is
inherited sin, 'what a grevious mortal guilt original sin
is in the sight .of God!' (Ap. II,45). Original sin is
original guilt, "culpa originls 11 (A.C. XXIV,25). Not for
one moment is concupiscence ever an "adiaphoron," 'neither
good nor bad' (Ap. II,4lf.), but it is noena et peccatum,

23werner Elert, The Structure of Lutheranism, translated by
Walter A. Hansen, I (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1962), 21.
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at once penalty and guilt (Ap. II,47), it is the
punishment inflicted on Adam's children for Adam's deed,
and yet it never ceases to be the sin and guilt of Adam's
chi ldren. Guilt ·and not being able to do otherwise,
guilt and ignorance, responsibility and nature are not
mutually exclusive in the doctrine of sin. In numerous
statements any rationalizing of these dreadful para~oxes
is expressly declined (cf., e.g., Ap. II,1,38,42).2
In the Confessions the full seriousness of sin and our accountability
for sin stares us starkly in the face.
trifling matter.

Sin and Adam's fall are no

In fact, it exceeds all human reasoning what a

horrible wrath of God has been handed on to us by this disobedience.
The results of original sin are many and manifold in their
implications.

Of special interest to this study is man's ignorance

of God and the tyranny of Satan to which man, the fallen creature, ·
is now subjected.

Schlink in his summary focuses his emphasis on

the "Wrath of God" as he considers the results of original sin.

He

gives man's natural ignorance of God separate treatment.
Thus we al1 stand under the ·angry God who 'wants to punish
sin in so dreadful a manner with both temporal and eternal
penalties' (Ap. IV,129). There (Gen. 3) human nature is
subjected not only to death and other physical ills, but
also to the rule of the devil (Ap. II,46), who keeps all
men under his tyrannical rule, smites them with blindness,
and seduces to vice. Through Adam's disobedience, i.e.,
through God's wrath because of Adam's disobedience, all
men are "subject to death and the devil" (S.A. III,·i,J.).
Thus al1 of us are "'by nature the children of wrath,' of
death, and of damnation" (S.D. 1,6) . Over against the wrath
of God man with all his works is "like a ~ ttle feather
tossed aside by a hurricane' (Ap. IV,47).
·

5

24schlink, Theology, p.
2 5Ibid.

44.
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It is essential for us now to consider a man's ignorance of God
as a result of original sin.

Knowledge and will fit together, and

the Confessions recos i ze this by pointing out the impossibility of
natural man accomplishing God's will when he does not know God.

And

the Confessions deny that natural man has the ability to know God.
God is hidden both from man's creatureliness and his corruption.

In

this fallen world neither God's love nor wrath can be recognized by
fallen man.

In fact, the ignoratio Dei is termed the essence of original

sin.
Among the "more serious faults of human nature" are mentioned "ignoring God, despising Him • • • " ( 'this is our
true and supreme misery that we are all born in such a way
that we do not know, see, or notice God and the works of
God, but despise God • • • • ' (Ap. II,8). Original sin
"involves such faults as ignorance of God, contempt of God,
lack of the fear of God and of trust in him, inability to
love him" (Ap. II,14). To define sin correctly we must
include the loss of 'the knowledge of God' (Ap. II,23).
Before we heard God's Word 'we were entirely of the devil,
knowing nothing either of God's love or of God's wrath;
for, as long as the human heart is at rest~ it 'does not
feel God's wrath or judgment' (Ap. IV,9).2
Thus man by his own powers is incapable of obtaining any knowledge
of God, either from nature or from God's self-revelation in His Word.
"Original sin spells ignor~ce of God in the most comprehensive sense. 1127 ·
Is there then a contradiction when the Confessions speak of "Man's
reason or natural intellect" as they frequently do?

26Ibid., p. 48, 49.
2 7Ibid.., p. 49.

For example, man
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has a "dim spark of the knowle dge that there is a God II

(

)
28
S.D. II,9.

This question receives no direct answer in the Confessions.
Apparently it was not r~garded as sufficiently significant to require
harmonization with the doctrine of the total ignorance of God.
Schlink demonstrates how the Confessions understand the "dim spark"
to function in relation to God's law.
T'ne decalo5-ue requires not only external works which reason can
accomplish but first and foremost fear and love toward God • . However,
true fear and love of God are "far beyond the reach of reason."
Natural man fails to recognize that the real demands of the Ten
Conunandments can not be fulfilled.

Rather he attempts his self-

justification by external observance of the law.

"For all human

reason and wisdom cannot but hold that we must become righteous by
the law and that a person externally observing the law is holy and
righteous (A p.

IV, 159). 1129

Since the natural knowledge of the law does not even achieve a
realization of God's wrath much less His love, it serves to intensify
man's estrangement from God.

In fact, when man takes this "dim spark"

or general knowledge of God seriously and attempts to put it into
·practice
by calling God by name and devising a ritual for him,
he only falls more deeply into sin with his natural
obedience to the law and does not come to God but to idols.
It is true on the one hand that "there has never been a

2 8rbid., p.

51.

29Ibid., p.

50.
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people so wicked that it did not establish and maintain
some sort of worship,'! but it is true without exception,
on the other hand, that "everyone has set up a god of
his own, to which he 8oked for blessings, help and
comfort" (L.C. I,17).
.

3

Hence the natural man knows there is a God but does not know
who that God is or ·what He is like.

Man grasps something of what

is demanded of him (in the Law), but does not understand who demands
it, and so fails to recognize God's wrath.

Thus natural man knows

neither God nor his own predicament; he fails to acknowledge the
innate uncleanness of human nature.

God's Word alone is able to

reveal to us who God is and who we truly are.
And "this cannot be adjudged except from the Word of
God" (Ap. II,13; cf. 34). "This hereditary sin is so
deep a corruption of nature that reason cannot understand it. It must be believed because of the revelation in the Scriptures" (S.A. III,i,3; cf. also Ep. . .
l,9; S.D. I,8). Original sin is "ultimately the worst
damage • • • , that we shall not only endure God's
eternal ·wrath and death but that we do not even realize
what we are suffering" (S.D. I,62).31
Even our creatureliness remains hidden from our natural knowledge.
Man's utter helplessness apart from God's . saving self-rev~lation is
brought home with raw power.

Here is a case where "ignorance is not

bliss" but the very opposite.
The Flacian controveries made it necessary for the Formula of
Concord to make a clear distinction between man's creatureliness and

30ibid., p. 51.
31Ibid., p. 52.
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his corruption.

We cannot discuss this controversy in detail here but

the Formula's conclusions should be noted.
The Solid Decla.:r.-c;~::Lon roakes three affirmative points:
that mankind's i nher ited spiritual malady is truly sin;
that nature comes from God but sin from the devil; that
the corruption of human nature is complete and total.
These points are followed by a sunnnary of the declarations
of the Apology with reference to the results, extent,
terribleness, penalty and cure of original sin.32
The Epitome also points out the necessity of a distinction between
human nature and sin, the reasons for this distinction, and reaffirms
the total corruption of human nature which results from original sin.
We believe, teach, and confess that there is a distinction
between man's nature and original sin, but only in the
beginning when God created man pure and holy and without
sin, but also as we now have our nature af'ter the Fall.
Even after the fall our nature is and remains a creature of
God. The distinction between our nature and original sin
is as great as the difference between God's work and the
devil's ·work. 33
There are several other implications in the Confessional doctrine
of original sin; for instance, .the relatio~ship of original sin to
sexuality:

"Ever since man sinned, natural desire and the lust that

in:f1.ames it conetogether; therefore marriage is more necessary now than
in a state of purity."34 Kierkegaard also mentions this subject, but
unfortunately we cannot delve further into it.

It might make a good

subject of study by itself and shed some meaning:f'ul. light on a subject
that is repeatedly discussed but often misunderstood in our sex-obsessed

32Allbeck, Studies, p. 257.

33:Bc, p. 466. .
34rbid., p. 241..
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culture.
Of necessity there will. be much overlapping between the subject
we have just covered, namely original sin, and the subject to which
we now turn, namely free will.

FoF all practical purposes the ·

Confessions treat both as two sides of the same coin.
Free Will
The background against which the concept of free will. unfolds
in the Confessions is the Pelagian heresy which though condemned
still. lingered in the medieval church.

Basically the stance taken

by Pelagianism failed to take seriously original sin and is the
antithesi~ of all that has been previously said concerning natural
~.an's condition and predicament before God.

When free will. is considered

in the Confessions it is considered only i~ relationship to natural man
after the Fall..

As Allbeck notes, "There may be a study of human

nature as created, or as born, or as reborn."35 The Confessions focus
on man as he is "born. " ·
At. the outset it should be noted that the' approach of the Confessions is Scripturall.y based.

Its inquiry is about fre~ will. in

unregenerate man, born according to nature, dominated by original sin.
No attempt to solve the philosophical:- problem of free will is made.
Religious implications of the doctrine are the ~hief concern of the
Confessions and its definition of free will. is a theological one.

35Al.lbeck, Studies, p. 107.
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There is little concern expressed about reconciling the tension of
man's creatureliness and his corruption.

Philosophical detenninism

which has so preoccupied western thought was not a concern of the
Confessions.

The philosophical. approach to human freedom impinges

upon the existentialist movement in Berdyaev whose concept of personal freedom differs radically from orthodox Christian doctrine.36
In the Formula the further explication of free will is grounded
not only in Scripture but also in the previous confessional statements made in the Augsburg Confession and the Apology.

Allbeck notes

that the framers of the Formula used Melanchthon's methods to propogate not his, but Luther's views.

The theological position of the

Formula is thoroughly Lutheran·. 37
The Synergistic controversy is the occasion for the further
consideration of this subject in the Formula.
the monergism of God's grace.

Luther insisted on

His view was that "man does nothing

in conversion, but the divine agency operates in him through the
means of grace ... 38 Nevertheless, Luther did recognize that man
could resist this offered grace.

But

36ia_umpp, David J. "Concept of Personal Freedom in Berdyaev"
(Unpublished Bachelor's Thesis, Concordia Seminary, St. Louis, 1959),
pp. 11, 19.
37Allbeck, Studies, p. 252.
38Ib.d
--2:....·, p. 259.
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In the course of the years Melanchthon wrote on these
topics in such a wa:y as to make less sharply clear themonergism of God's grace. He used broader and somewhat
more ambiguous terms. Instead of viewing conversion
only from GQd's side, he tried to see it from -man's
side also. 3~
Some of Melanchthon's students became synergists and this made
necessary the clarification the Formula pr esents.

Basically it seeks

to answer this q_uestion: What spiritual abi lity does unregenerate
human nature have?
Perhaps the best background or introduction is offered by the
Confessions themselves in the following paragraph.
But it is of these that the Scripture everywhere warns us
of these that the prophets constantly complain, namely,
carnal security, contempt of God, hate of God, and similar
faults that we are born with. The scholastics mingled
Christian doctrine with philosophical views about the perfection of nature and attributed more than was proper to
free will and to 11elicited acts.'' They taught that men are
justified before God by philosophical or civic righteousness,
which we agree is subject to reason and somewhat in our power.
But thereby they failed to see the inner uncleanness of
human nature. T'nis cannot be adjudged except from the Word
of God, which the scholastics ~8 not of'ten employ in their
discussions {Ap. II,11,12,13) • .
With this brief background we mey now begin our consideration of
the ·concept of free will.

The Augsburg Confession succinctly picture·s

our Confes~ional position in Article eighteen.
It is also taught among us that man possesses some measure
of freedom of the will which enables him to live an outwardly honorable life and to make choices among the things
that reason comprehends. But without the grace, help, and
activity of the Holy Spirit man is not capable of making

-

39Ibid.
4~,. p. 102. ·
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himself acceptable to God, of fearing God and believing
in God with his whole heart, or of e~pelling inborn evil
lusts from his heart. This is accomplished by the Holy
Spirit, who is given through the Word of God, for Paul
says in 1 Cor. 2:14, "Natural man does not receil{:r_ the
gii'ts of the Spirit of God," (A.C. XVIII,1,2,3).
The first thing to strike us in this article is the clear distinction made between the "outwardly honorable life" and true
righteousness before God.

The Apology adds to our understanding of

this distinction.
Therefore we may profitably 9-istinguish between civil
righteousness and spiritual righteousness, attributing
the fonner to the free will and the latter to the operation of the Holy Spirit in the reg~nerate. · This safeguards outward discipline, because all men ought to know
that God requires this civil righteousness and that, to
some extent, we can achieve it. At the same time it shows
the difference between human righteousness and spiritual
righteousness, between philosophical teaching and the
teaching of the Holy Spirit; and i42points out the need
for the Holy Spirit (Ap. XVIII,9).
·
From this -...re observe that our terminology is defined, "civil
righteousness" being in part at least a product of free will, and
"spiritual righteousness" which is the result of the Holy Spirit's
operation in man.

The interesting thing to note is the ambiguity here

in defining t _h e limits of man's ability to attain civil righteousness,
for the words "to some extent we can achieve it" leave the question
of 'to what extent' unresolved.

By the very nature of this question,

however, we become involved in the complexities of human ·relativity.

41 Ibid., p. 39.

42Ibid., p. 226.

The Confessions are aware of this as they point out:
We are .not denying freedom to the human will. The human
will has freedom to cho0se among the works and things
which reason by itself c :.:1 grasp. To some extent it can
achieve civil righteousnes s or the righteousness of works.
It can talk about God and express its worship of him in
outward works. It can obey rulers and parents. Externally,
it can choose to keep the hands from murder, adultery, or
the~. Since human nature still has reason and judgment
about the thi ngs that the senses can grasp, it also
r etains a choice in these things , as well as the liberty
and ability to achieve civil righteousness. This
righteousness which the carnal nature--that is, the
reason--can achieve on its o,-m without the Holy Spirit,
Scripture calls the righteousness of the flesh. But so
great is the power of concupiscence that men obey their
evil impulses more often than their sound judgment, while
the devil, who as Paul says (Eph. 2:2) is at work in the
ungodly, never stops inciting this feeble nature to various
of fenses. For these reasons even civik righteousness is
rare among men •• • • (Ap. XVIII,4,5). 3
The pivotal place of reason in the functioning of civil righteousness is apparent in the foregoing statement.

Since man's ability to

reason varies from one to another a relativity will be observable in
natural man's achievement of civil righteousness.

However, one .dare

not predicate man's attainment of civil righteousness solely on the
basis of reason, because a foreign element is introduced here, namely,
the devil and temptation.
The limitation put upon reason is also extremely significant,
for it is limited to only "those things which the senses can grasp."
Hence, that which transcends sense perception is out of bonds to
reason.

43Ibid., p. 225.
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The limitation put upon reason is also extremely significant,
for it is limited to only "those things which the senses can grasp.
Hence, that which transcends sense perception is out o~ bonds to
reason.
A connection between reason, judgment and choice is also mentioned.

Natural man retains a choice in the "things that the

senses can gra::-:p, 11 and has the liberty and ability to achieve civil
righteousness to this extent.
The lament that few attain even to the "righteousness of works"
is valid for the Confessions maintain that God requires such
righteousness of man.
We for our part maintain that God requires the righteousness of' reason. Because of God's command, honorable works
commanded in the Decalogue should be perfonned, according
to Gal. 3:24, "The law is a custodian," and 1 Tim. 1:9,
"the law is laid down for the lawless." For God wants
this civil discipline to restrain the unspiritual, and
to preserve it he has given laws, learning, teaching,
governments, and penalties. To some extent, reason can
produce this righteousness by its own strength, though
it is often overwhelmed by its natural weakness and by
the devil, who drives it to open crimes. We freely give
this righteousness of reason its due credit; for our
corrupt nature has no greater good than this • • • • God
even honors it with material rewards. Nevertheless, it
ought ~ot be praised at the expense of Christ (Ap. rl,
22f). 4
~
Here the constructive function of civil righteousness is
acknowledged, but the last sentence alludes to the possibility ·or
this righteousness of reason getting in the way of true spiritual

44Ib.d
__L·, p. 110.
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righteousness.

This is our next point.

Although we concede to free will the liberty and ability
to do the outward works of the law, we do not ascribe to
it the spiritual capacity for true fear of God, true faith
in God, true knowledge and trus that God considers, hears
and forgives us (Ap. XVIII, 7).

45

Thus we can conclude that in view of the Confessions "true fear
of God, true faith in God, true knowledge of God" are not products
of human reason.
the senses.

First, because God stands beyond the grasp of

Second, because human reason has fallen into an alien

captivity, namely that of the devil.

This stand is forcibly

driven home in the Fonnula.
Although man's reason or natural intellect still has a
dim spark of the knowledge that there is a God, as well
as of the teaching of the law (Rom. 1:19-21,28,32) nevertheless, it is so ignorant, blind and perverse that when
even the most gifted and the most educated people on earth
read or hear the Gospel of the Son of God and the promise
of eternal salvation, they cannot by their own powers
perceive this, comprehend it, understand it, or believe
and accept it as the truth. On the contrary, the more
zealously and diligently they want to comprehend these
spiritual things with their reason; the less they understand or believe, and until the Holy Spirit enlightens
and teaches them they coll ider it all mere foolishness .
and fables (F.C. II, 9).

5

The preceding paragraph echoes Luther's eloquent explanation
to the third article of the Apostles' Creed.

Here too, the limits

of human reason and strength are sharply drawn.
In this statement from the Formula the assertion is ma.de that
reason can actually hinder man's understanding and faith in the

45Ib"d
_ L · , p. 225, 226.
46Ib"d
__1._., p. 521, 522.
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Gospel of the Son of God.

The foundation for this assertion is

the catalog of Scripture passages marshalled to show the inability
of human reason to comprehend Divine grace.

The key passage in

this list is (1 Cor. 2:14) "The unspiritual man does not receive
the gifts of the Spirit of God, for they are folly for him, and
he is not able to understand them because they are spiritually
discerned."

The conclusion the Formula draws is:

Thus Scripture denies to the intellect, heart, and will
of the natural man every capacity, aptitude, skill and
ability to think anything good or right in spiritual
matters, to understand them, to begin them, to will them,
to undertake them, to do them, to accomplish or
cooperate in them as of himself. ''Not that we are sufficient of ourselves to claim anyth:i.ng as c~,ing from us;
our sufficiency is from God~' (2 Cor.3:5).
Hence the verdict of the Formula concurs and supports the
position affirmed in the Augsburg Confession and Apology.

In

the realm of the spirit, man's "free _w ill" is impotent, and if
anything his reason is a hindrance.
Accordingly, we believe that after the Fall and prior to .
his conversion not a spark of spiritual powers has remained or exists in man by which he could make himself
ready for the grace of God or to accept the preferred
grace, nor that ·he has any capaci~y for grace by and for
himself or can apply himself to it or prepare l':limself
for it, or help, do, effect, or cooperate his conversion
by his own powers, either altogether or half-way or in
the tiniest or smallest degree, 11of himself as coming
from himself," but is a slave of .sin (John 8:34), the
captive of the devil who drives him (Eph. 2:2; 2 Tim.

47Ibid., p. 522.
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2:26). Hence according to its perverse disposition
a nd nature the natural free wi ll is mighty and active
only in the direction of that ~hich is displeasing and
contrar y to God (F.C. II, 7). 4'
Allbeck notes t hat the threefold designation "intellect, he~rt,·
and will" reflects the "ancient psychological distincti'On of the
intellectual, the volitional, and the affective phases of the
mind. 1149

The Confessions thus reflect the traditional psychological

understanding of man.
All that has been stated here could have been stated under the
concept of original sin.

This underscores again the point already

made , that in the Confessions original sin is the conditioning
factor in understanding the free will.
However, the Fonnula, too, recognizes the constructive con~
tribution of civil righteousness produced in part by free will.
It allows that God rewards civil righteousness with temporal
blessings.

The Formula also notes that since such outwardly noble

acts do not flow from faith, they are sinful.

Faith alone is

recognized as "the mother and source of the truly good and Godpleasing ~orks that God wi ll reward both in this and in the next
world . 11 5o

48 Ibid., p. 521.
49Allbeck, Studies, p. 261.

50
~, p. 552.

31
Faith is the indispensable prerequisite before we can do anything that pleases God.

If we can not please God, then spiritual

righteousness is impossible for us, and if so we are in bondage to
an alien evil power.

"For before we became members of the

Christian church we belonged entirely to the devil and were completely ignorant of God and Christ. 11 51 The urgent question now
becomes:

How can I prepare myself' for faith1

Quoting Luther tpe

Fonnula notes that our "free will has no power of its own to
prepare itself and to strive for righteousness."

There is no

cooperation on the part of man's will in conversion.

Rather,

Outside of Christ death and sin are our masters and the
devil is our god and lord, and there is no power or
ability, no cleverness or reason, with which we can
prepare ourselves for righteousness and seek after it.
On the contrary, we must remain the dupes and captives
of sin and the property of the devil to .do and to think
_what pleases them and what is contrary to God and His
commandments (F.C. II,43).~~
Natural man can do nothing to prepare himself' for salvation.
However, the Confessions do allow that natural man can expose himself' to the means through ~hich God works faith.

This point is

made by Bonhoeffer in The Cost of Discipleship and he no doubt
had this reference in mind.
The person who is not yet converted to God and regenerated can hear and . read this Word externally because,
as stated above, even after th~ Fall man still has

51Ibid., p. 528.
52~ . , p. 529.
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something of a free will in these external matters,
so that he can go to church, 1 ten to the sermon, or
not listen to it (F.C. II,53).

53

Faith and the Means of Grace
How does one come to faith?

God kindles faith through the

operation of His Holy Spirit who works through the means of grace
in the hearts, wills, and minds of men.
Through this means (namely, the preaching and hearing
of his Word) God is active, breaks our hearts, and
draws man, so that through the preaching of the law
man learns to know his sins and the wrath of God and
experiences genuine terror, contrition, and sorrow in
his heart, and through the preaching of and meditation upon the holy Gospel or the gracious forgiveness
of sin in Christ there is kindled in him a spark of
faith which accepts the forgiveness of sins for
Christ's sake and comforts itself with the promise of
the Gospel. And in this way the Holy Spirit who works
all this, is introduced into the heart (F.C. II,54).54
So God draws natural man in such a way that his darkened reason
becomes enlig~tened and his resisting will becomes an obedient
will.

The Holy Spirit initiates the work of renewal and regeneration

in us through the Word and the holy Sacraments.

And although natural

man is unable to cooperate in his conversion, regenerate man can
and. must cooperate with the power of the Holy Spirit in his sanctification, even though this be in great ~eakness.55. Hence there is

53Ibid~, p. 531.
54 Ibid.
55Ibid., pp. 533, 534.
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a great difference betwee~ natural man and regenerate man.
There is therefore a great difference between baptized
people and unbaptized people because, according to the
teaching of St. Paul, "all who have been baptized have
put on Christ" (,.,JJ.. 3:27) , are thus truly born again,
and now have a liberated will--that is, as Christ says,
they have again been made free. As a result, they not
only hear the Word of God but also are able to assent
to it and accept it even though it be in great weakness (F.C. II,67).56
Conversion does not spell the end to the struggle for freedom.
Rather freedom in a spiritual sense begins only with faith.

This

casts us full force into the fray as the following words show.
But since in this life we have received only the first
fruits of the Spirit, and regeneration is not as yet
perfect but has only begun in us, the conflict and .
warfare of the flesh against the Spirit continues also
in the elect and truly reborn. Again, there is not
only a great difference between Christians, one being
weak and the other strong in the Spirit, but even the
individual Christian in his own life discovers that
at one moment he is joyful in the Spirit and at another
moment fearful and terrified, at one time ardent in
love, strong in faith and in hope, and at another time
cold and weak (F.C. II,68).57
How aptly this describes the Christian life can only be recognized by a believer engaged in this same struggle.
This section of our study can be concluded with words from
Luther's masterful treatise on the subject of man's not so free will.
If we do not want to drop this term altogether (namely
free will)--which would really be the safest and most
Christian thing to do--we may still in good faith
teach people to use it to credit man with 'free-will'

56Ibid., p. 534.
57Ibid.

in this respect, not of what is above him, but of
what is below him. That is to say, man should
rea lize that in regard t o his money and possessions
he has a right to use them, to do or to leave undone,
according to his own 'free-will'--though that very
'free-will' is overruled by the free-will of God
alone, according to His own pleasure. However, with
regard to God, and in all that bears on salvation
or damnation, he has no 'free-will', but is a captive·,
prisoner and bondslavse either to the will of God, or
to the will of Satan.
Conclusions
The first consideration noted in this chapter was the pervasive
understanding of man as creature and God as Creator in the Confessions.

The Christian study of man must operate within this

framework and the Confessions certainly do.

In fact, so pervasive

is this understanding that Confessional statements on original
sin and free will of ten presuppose the creatureliness of man.

This

perhaps explains why there is in the Confessions no separate
treatment given to the Fall or to the Image of God.
In our examination of original sin we discovered the important.
distinction between man's nature as creature, and thus the handiwork of God, and man's corrupted nature, the work of Satan.

The

totality of man's impotence in spiritual matters could hardly have
been more emphatically stated.

The disastrous effect of original

sin is not limited to man's body while his soul escapes unscathed..
Rather man is treated as a whole, and his whole nature is involved

58r.uther, The Bondage of the Will, p. 107.
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in the corruption and poisoning that results from original sin.59
This understanding of man effectively blocks the classic dualistic
view of man prevalent in western idealism.
In our study of free will a distinction between civil righteousness and spiritual righteousness became evident.

The intimate

connection of reason to civil righteousness was apparent in that
such human goodness was even termed "the righteousness· of reason."
The limits of reason were likewise noted and the boundaries fixed
at "the things which the senses can grasp. 1160 This position
undercuts any rationalistic or philosophical approach to God, just
as the interpretation of original sin demolishes all moralistic
approaches to God.

In this chapter we also discovered that the Confessional
statements on original sin and free will are in reality two sides
of the same stone.

Natural man sees free will as the top side,

but when he seriously considers it, stoops, and picks µp ,the stone,
he discovers on the underside, amid the slugs and ·slime, the
inescapable reality of original sin.

Even this discovery can not

be made without the Holy Spirit's activity in natural ·man.

Once

· this realization is .accepted, it disallows any presumed powers
of free will in the spiritual ·realm.

There is therefore in the

Confessional exposition of these two concepts an essential oneness.

59Supra, p. 10.
60Supra, p. 25.

Another pertinent observation is the form of the Confessional
presentation of this position.

In a sense the framers of our

Confessions were in the position of one vho had just challenged
another to a duel and thus had forfeited the choice of weapons.
Although scholastic methodology and terminology is used in the
Confessions, these do not obscure the evangelical thrust of the
Confessions' message • . The rhythm of sin and grace, law and gospel
is certainly apparent.

T'ne pragmatic concern for man's eternal

salvation is constantly kept in the forefront.

Nevertheless,

some of the strong new wine of the biblical view of man is poured
i nto the old wine skins of tradj_tional sc holastic categories.
This ,ras no doubt done to show continuity with past tradition, but
at times it seems to blunt the cutting edge of man's paradoxical
nature as "saint and sinner" or creature and corrupted creature.
The exact relationship of reason and will ·was not made explicit
in the Confessions.

But implicit in the Confessional understanding

of man is the view that reason is antecedent to will.

This under-

standing of the relationship between reason and will lends itself to
the abuse ff rationalism, and history bears this out.
The Confessions approach both original sin and free will from
God's point of view.
from God to man.

The direction of movement is consistently

Psychology and philosophy, while implicit here

and there in the Confessional statements, are not explicitly
defined.

It is also significant that the Confessions place the

concepts of original sin and free will in the proper perspective
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by treating them within the context of the whole plan of salvation.
The Confessions accept the traditional view of man's integrity
prior to the Fall without speculation as to the difference in
existence before the advent of sin.

This is significant becaus~

we will note in chapter three that Kierkegaard does not accept
the traditional understanding of man's innocence.
One apparent wee.kness in the Confessions' exposition is the attempt
to make quantitive tenns express a quality of existence.

The term

"dim spark" occurs in an attempt to show that the possibility of
communication and communion with God exists.

The distinction between

external works and the work of the Holy Spirit which is viewed as
internal is a vulnerable distinction and liable to misapplication.
Bonhoeffer points this out in a later chapter.
The problem of the relationship ·between. "civil righteousness"
and "spiritual righteousness" is one which the Confessions struggle
to enunciate clearly.

It is obviously difficult to set forth this

relationship systematically in a comprehensive fashion.
this needs to be acknowledged.

Perhaps

On the other hand, perhaps the

categories of "civil righteousness" and "spiritual righteousness"
are not completely adequate.

We will note that Kierkegaard uses

different categories to make a distinction and yet show relationship
in chapter three.

Ultimately, the question seems to be:

"Can

Melanchthon's Aristotelian philosophy serve as an adequate vehicle
for dynamic Lutheran theology?"

Finally, our Confessions do not attempt to expatiate on original
sin and free will from the human point of view.

When Melanchthon

attempted to view conversion f!om the human perspective difficulty
arose.

Mela.nchthon's attempt and the consequent controversy may

be a portent of things to come, for we turn now to Kierkegaard's
concept of human freedom.

CHAPTER III

KIERKEGAARD'S CONCEPT OF FREE WILL
The Man, the Me·.:.n0d , and the Motive
The moment I take Christianity as a doctrine and so indulge
my cleverness or profundity or my eloquence or my imaginative powers in depicting it: people are very pleased; I am
looked upon as a serious Christian.
The moment I begin to express existentially what I say,
a nd consequently to bring Christianity into reality:
it is just as though I had exploded existence--the scandal
is there at once.l
This introduction of Kierkegaard, the man, will of necessity be
brief.

There is a plethora of introductory material available to the

serious student.

Instead of presenting an interpretation of

Kierkegaard's early life it see~s best to let him speak for himself
from his Journals.

In 1835 he penned these lines:

Then it was that the great earthquake occurred, the
terrible revolution which suddenly forced upon me a
new and infallible law of interpretation of all the
facts. Then I suspected that my father's great age was
not a divine blessing but rather a curse; that the outstanding intellectual gifts of our family were only given
to us in order that we should rend each other to pieces:
then I felt the stillness of death grow around me when~
saw my father, an unhappy ·man who was to outlive us all,
a cross on the tomb of all his hopes. There must be a
guilt upon the whole family, the punishment of God must
be on it; it was to disappear, wiped out by the powerful
hand of God, obli terated like an unsuccessful attempt,
and only at :times did I find a little alleviation in the
1s~ren Kierkegaard, The Journals of Kierke~ard, translated by
Alexander Dru (New York: Harper & Brothers, 195 ), p. 174.

~
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t hought that my father had been allotted the heavy task
of calming us with the consolation of religion, of
ministering to us so that a better world should be open
t o us even though we lost everything in this world, even
t hough we were overtaken by the punishment which the
J ews a lways called down upon t heir enemies: that all
recollection of us should be utterly wiped out, that
we should no longer be found.2
Two years later Kierkegaard would note in his Journal:
Inwardly torn asunder as I was, without any expectation of
leading a happy earthly life ( 11 that I shou•l d prosper and
live long in the land"), without hope of a happy and comfortab le future--as it naturally springs from and lies in
the historical continuity of family life--what wonder then
that in desperate despair I grasped at nought but the
intellectual side in man and clung fast to it, so that the
thought of my own considerable powers of mind was my only
consola.t.ion, ideas my one joy, and mankind indifferent to
me.3
In the foregoing autobiographical sketches we are given an
intimate and candid view of the heart and mind of S~ren ~~erkegaard..
Perhaps a few external facts about his lif e will prove helpful.
Copenhagen, Kierkegaard's home town, was a
town" during his life time (1813-1855).

11

provincial ma.r~et

At the age of twenty-five

S~ren began receiving an allowance from his father and later that
year when Michael P~dersen Kierkegaard. died S~ren received enough
of an inheritance to sustain his work as an author until his death
seventeen years later.
Kierkegaard never married although he was engaged.
engagement in October 1841.

2 Ibid., p. 39.
3Ibid., p. 40.

He broke this

This left a deep mark on him but this
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experience also marks the beginning of his literary work.

At forty-

two Kierkegaard died, nearly penniless, but having been in his words,
"a witness to the truth."
We turn now briefly to his "method" which sheds light on understanding his work.

Kierkegaard's first works (1841-1845) embrace

several aesthetic and ethical volumes published under pseudonymns.
For the most part, these works follow the method of indirect communication, and some of these are of considerable significance in the
Kierkegaard corpus.
Dru comments:

The oustanding feature of this part of his work is the
polemic against Hegel, a criticism of the whole corpus
of post-Christian philosophy from Spinoza to Hegel; an
attack on "philosophy" itself for its wordy metaphysics
and its verbal scepticism and for its original sin of .
divorcing thought from existence or reality. It is
also a criticism, on the moral and psychological level,
of the humanism of that period • • • • That world, with
its rationalist philosophies and its aesthetic humanism,
was, in his view, already moribund, a mirage, but a
potent illusion which prevented min from seeing the real
problems of both faith and doubt.
In the writings of this period Kierkegaard begins from various
points of view, but he always moves in the same direction, either
toward the "choice" in Either-Or or toward· the "leap of faith" in
Fear and Trembling.

He is guided by his conception of the

"individual" who encounters the

11

moment" in which "decision and

action fuse thought and existence, the moment in which temporal and

4 ~ , pp. 19, 20.
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eternal meet and man can fulfill his destiny. 11 5
In his attempt to counter Hegelianism Kierkegaard emphasizes
feeling of passion:
Kierkegaard would, however, be misunderstood if it were
not at once made clear that feeling is not sentiment or
emotion isolated from the other faculties of mind.
Feeling and passion are only the gateway to reality when
purified by reason and will and integrated by that process with the other faculties. Feeling is in one sense
the faculty which leads to the quality of intensity of
our knowledge, as opposed to knowledge which is significant by virtue of its extensity. It is only when both
are co-ordinated that "the individual" begins to exist
and becomes a complete man. The error of rationalism is
therefore twofold. It limits man to being "a rational
animal," and because it excludes feeling, limits him to
one form of communication which, by definition excludes
reality. It is the world of a mau who "has forgotten
what it means to exist," who does not eally live in the
same categories as he thinks in • • • •

5

From the foregoing it becomes clear that "the choice" and "the
leap of faith" are not arbitrary acts of the will divorced from
reason and feeling, but rather are actions of the whole man which
give him the right to speak of existence.

Dru observes:

It might almost be said that Kierkegaard reverses the
cogito. Instead of saying "I think., therefore I em,"
he says, "Only if I exist sensu eminenti can I begin to
think" and that thought, moreover, requires a dual form
of communication, both direct and indirect.7
Kierkegaard viewed "imagination" as the synthesis of feeling,
reason, and will.

It is the "reflection" which fuses the three

5rbid., p. 20.

6Ibid.,

P• 2J:

7Ibid., p.

'

23.

22.
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faculties of "the individual."

Choice which is the act by which the

fusion of feeling, reason, and will takes place is never for Kierkegaard
the choice of something c.,: ternal.

It is always the choice of one's

self, of a complete existence.
Prior to that constitutive act man is always consciously
or unconsciously in despair, for despair is the disintegration of personality in the course of which one or the
other of the faculties assumes 11 supremacy": either reason,
resulting ~n rationalism; or feeling, resulting in sentimentality; or will, resulting in voluntarism. It is
really only after the "choice" that "the leap of faith"
becomes possible, rgr only the complete man can really .
become a Christian.
As far as Kierkegaard is concerned, "man only begins to exist in
f a ith."

Real Christianity is a new level of existence.

The task is

not to prove Christianity before the fact, but to demonstrate it af'ter
t he fact.

Thus the second part of Kierkegaard's work becomes a direct

communication or witness to the Christian faith.

Dru regards the

"problem of communication 11 as the "distinctive characteristic" of
Kierkegaard's work, work upon ·which he renders this verdict:

11

That,

as far as I can see, i s the core of Kierkegaard's word, neither
r ationalistic, nor irrationalistic, nor inhuman. 119
Before leaving this section on method we must look at Heinemann's
evaluation of two of Kierkegaard's works central to this study.

The

Conce pt of Dread (?,-844) is from Kierkegaard's early pseudonymous writings,
while The Sickness Unto Death

8rbid.
9Ibid., pp. 23, 24.

(1849) is from Kierkegaard's later works.
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Self-estrangement is to him primarily a process going on
in one's O\m self, not an external, but an internal relation, based on one's o~ attitude to oneself. Kierkegaard
therefore becomes the psychologist or rather the psychopathologist of self-estrangement. He heralds the Age of
Anxiety by describing the s·tate of alienation as anxiety.
In the Concept of Dread this sort of alienation finds a
most profound and penetrating psychological analysis as
11
being dominated in a state of anxiety by an alien power
which threatens our dissolution."
He goes, however, one step further in his analysis of
alienation as an internal happening within oneself in his The
Sickness unto Death. Anxiety is now transformed into despair,
and despair is "the sickness unto death. 11 This is one of the
most important of his publications; it implies a phenomenology
of despair and of its forms and, at the same time, a sort of
existentialist psychology of despair. It marks simultaneously
an important state in the spiritual history of modern man,
namely the point where modern doubt and scepticism turn inward,
focus on one's own self and therefore lead to despair. Despair,
says Kierkegaard, is the misproportion in the relation of the
self to itself, or every disturbance in the process of becoming a Self, a sort cf self-consumption, a specific illness
of man a s a spiritual bei ng, a rising from hi s attempt to
separate himself from the power which created him, or from
the fact that he neglects what is eternal in him a.~d forgets
his spiritual nature. Whoever haf no God has no Self, and
he who has no Self is in despair. 0
Having examined briefly the man and his method, we now look at
what is termed his "motive." This is meant to describe the theological-philosophical-cultural milieu in which Kierkegaard found himself
and in which he tried to act as a corrective.

For S~ren Kierkegaard

did consider himself to be a corrective.
He who must apply a "corrective must study accurately and
profoundly the weak side of the Establishment, and then
vigorously and one-sidedly present the opposite. Precisely
in this consists the corrective1 and in this too the

1 '7. H. Heinemann, Existentialism end the Modern Predicament
(New York: Harper Torchbooks; Harper & Brothers, Publishers, 1953),
pp. 36, 37.
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resignation of him who has to apply it. The corrective
will in a sense be sacrificed to the established order.
I f this is true, · a presumably clever pate can reprove the
corrective for being one - s~ded. Ye gods! Nothing is
easier for hi m who applies t he corrective than to supply
the other side; but then it ceases to be the corrective
and becomes t he established order. 11
vlhat did Kierkegaard feel constrained to correct?

~.artin gives

a quick glimpse of three f actors that influenced the course and emphasis

of Kie rkegaard's work.
There is firstly t he danger of the r at i onalistic approach
to t he understanding of Christianity, or the scientific
attitude which requi res the truth of Christianity to be
demonstrated with t he same logical conviction as the
sc i entist is able to produce for his truths. Kierkegaard
st ands for the position that the Christian Gospel, by its
very nature cannot be understood within rational and
logical categories. Human rea son is a divine gift to
man • • • • But in rela tion to the Divine world of eternity,
human rea son comes up against a boundary beyond which it
cannot operate successt'u.lly, because beyond that boundary
it is attempting to deal with a truth which is incommensurable
with the scientific truth of the material world.12
A second factor that inf1.uenced Kierkegaard is closely related
to the rationalist approach.

It is:

t he danger of the approach to the understanding of
Christianity through Idealistic Philosophy, and especially
through the conception of the Divine as immanent in all
the processes of nature and in the spirit of man. Such philosophy implies an ultimate _continuity between nature, man and
God; otherwise the aim of the philosophical thinker to present
a coherent system of Reality would be impossible.13

lls~ren Kierkegaard, Attack Upon 'Christendom,' translated by
Walter Lowrie (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1944), p. 90.
12H. v. Martin, The Wings of Faith (A consideration of the nature
and meaning of Christian faith in the light of the work of S~ren
Kierkegaard) .(New~·York: Philosophical Li brary, 1951.), p. 38.
13Ibi· d. ,
pp. 38' 39 •
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In the face of both rationalism and a religious philosophy of
i mmanence Kierkegaard insisted on the "infinite qualitative difference"
between God and man, time and eternity.
tence.

Sin had severed man's exis-

Any real Gospel .had to cope with and remedy the tragic predica-

ment of man'q dividedness.
The third danger which Kierkegaard sought to combat was the
danger of a "far:ile acceptance of nominal Christianity without ever
experiencing 'the qualitative encounter ·with the Divine.,,; Thus
Kierkegaard
s et himsel f to awaken inward unrest by proclaiming the
New Te st ament standard of what it means to be a Christian.
Mere birth i nt o a Christian community, or membership in a
Christi an Church is of no avail. Blind assent to Christian
dogma i s not faith but superstition. Nor is saving faith
just the natural awakening of the soul to the all-pervading
pr e sence of the i mmanent Divine. To be a Christian in
the New Testament sense means that every individual as
a n individual shall relate himself personally to Christ
in fear and trembling through the leap of pas~ionate decision in the despair of his guilt before God.14
Martin points out that contrasted to the anthropocentric tendencies of
Christian theology in his day, Kierkegaard's theology stands out
sharply as theocentric. 1 5 These aforementioned factors all exerted
influence upon Kierkegaard's life and work.
But Kierkegaard also viewed ~utheranism as a corrective.
Lutheranism is a corrective--but a corrective made into
the norm, the whole, is eo ipso con:f'using in the neJC1;
generation (when that which it was meant to correct no

l4Ibid.: pp.

39, 40.

l5Ibid., p. 40.
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longer exists). And as long as this continues things
get wors e with every generation, until in the end the
correcti ve produces tbe exact opposite of what was
origi nally intended.16
This view would explain the constant reference to Roman Catholic
dogma in the presentation of Luther an t he ology.

However, when

Kierkegaard applies this standard to Luther an theology he lays himself
open to like application.

His verdict on Lutheran theology in his

day was negative, "Taken by itself, as the whole of Christianity,
the Lut hern corrective produces the most subtlety~ of worldiness
.
17
and paganism."
Let's see how his theology fares.
Kier kegaard's dialectical presentation of his thought leaves
him vulnerable to various interpretations.

In this ch~pter we will

note how he has been misunderstood as well as understood.

The fact

t hat Kier kega ard is more concerned with describing true "religiosity 11
t han with defining doctrine makes this task difficult.

Thomte

observes:
In Kierkegaard the approach to religious faith is subj ective. His focus is not doctrine but reli giosity. ·
His emphasis is on the act of faith rather than the
object of faith. Religiosity and inwardness are not sub-:
ject to objective scientific research, hence th~ scientific method cannot be the nonn of Christianity.ltl

16icierkegaard, The Journals, pp. 232, 233.
l7Ibid., p. 233.
18Reidar Thomte, Kierke aard's Philosooh; of Reli ion (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 19 9,
referred to as Thomte, Philosophy.
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The Consciousness of Sin
This writer suspects that Kierkegaard would object to his attempt
to treat sin as a concept, and insist that it be considered as an
existential reality since all men are involved in it.

Likewise, this

same concern could be expressed toward selfhood, freedom, and faith.
Kierkegaard points out the danger of assuming that in the act of comp19
rehension we stand above the position we compreheild.
Aware of this
danger, we begin with Kierkegaard's thinking on the "consciousness
of sin. 11
The "consciousness of sin" is the distinguishing category in
Kierkegaard's thinking.
and Christianity.
sin.

It is the dividing line between paganism

Only a Christian can realize that his guilt is

If this were a philosophical enterprise, the logical concept

to consider first would be Kierkegaard's understanding of "selfhood, 11
but since ours is a theological inquiry we begin with the consciousness of sin.

Kierkegaard would appreciate our beginning here, for

he wrote:
The concept by ·which Christianity distinguishes itself'
most decisively from paganism is the concept of sin,
doctrine of sin; and therefore Christianity also assumes
quite consistently that neither paganism nor the natural
man knows what sin is; yea, it assumes that there must be
a revelation from God to make manifest what sin is.20

19
s~ren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling and The Sickness unto
Death, translated by Walter Lowrie (New York: Doubleday & Company,
Inc., Doubleday Anchor Books, 1941), p. 227. Herea~er referred to
as Kierkegaard, ~ or Sickness.
·
20Ibid., p. 220.
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To comprehend the consciousness of sin it is necessary to understand Kierkegaard's distinction between immanent religiosity and
transcendent Christianity.

To this we now turn.

The Distinction between Immanence and Transcedence
Kierkegaard makes a sharp distinction between what he terms
Religion "A," which is an immanent religiosity that p_resupposes the
immanence of truth in the human subjectivity, and Religion "B" which
is "paradoxical Christianity."

In Religion "A" moral and religious

life can be integrated by means of inner effort within the personality.
However, in Religion "B" or Christianity the presupposition is that
human subjectivity is not truth, but untruth.

In the realm of transJ

cedent Christianity inner effort within the personality can only

I

result in a consciousness of the absolute gulf between man and Gcd.

I

Hence Christianity affirms that the personality can only be brought
to soundness by the revelation of God in history.

Religion "A" has

a plus at the foundation of human nature, whereas Religion "B" or
Christianity has a minus.

21

"The paradoxical religiousness breaks

with immanence and ma.ltes the fact of existing the absolute contra22
diction, not within immanence, but against immanence."
Failure to recognize this distinction is the cause of much
misinterpretation of Kierkegaard's writings.

Kierkegaard's

21Thomte, Philosophy, p. 87.
22
s~ren Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific. Postscript, translated by David F. Swenson and Walter Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1941), p. 507.

50
Edifying Discourses written in his early period are directed toward
the religiosity of irrananence, not Christianity.

Kierkegaard began

with the realm of immanence because in his judgment this is where
natural man is, for apart from God's revelation no one enters into the
reality of paradoxical Christianity.
Nevertheless, even in Religion "A" or immanence man experiences
resignation, suffering, and guilt.

Even in innnanent religiousness

Kierkegaard does not get away from the thought of inherited sin.
religious healing God is the actor, though the healing is brought
about by man's own effort.
It is God Himself who best. knows how to utilize a man's
mm anxieties for the purpose of extirpating all his
self-confidence; and when he is about to sink down into
his mm nothingness, it is again God Himself who can best
keep him from continuing to maintain a ~ ver's underwater connection with his earthly self.

3

Kierkegaard maintained that God does not reveal Himself in the
objective world round about us; but He reveals Himself as the foundation for the subjective.

Therefore with regard to inunanent religious-

ness Kierkegaard makes the oft misquoted statement "truth is subjec. ·ty. 1124.
t l.VJ.
Kierkegaard's novel approach toward the religion of immanence
has a purpose.

He encourages man to follow this path betting t!'.at

2 3s~ren Kierkegaard, Edifying Discourses, translated by David F.
Swenson and Lillian l<1'.arvin Swenson (Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing
House, 1945), II, 132.
24iuerkegaard, The Concluding Unscientific Postscript, pp. 169-224.
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he will confront the deadend of the qualitative difference between God
and man, a difference which is sin.

Instead of cautioning people

against the path of immanence, Kierkegaard waves them on so that they
might come to the contradiction and realize the importance of a
religiosity of immanence.

In his aesthetic and ethical writings

Kierkegaard points out that living in immediacy and living by the
· un iVersal leaves one is despair.

Thus he encourages:

Choose despair, for despai r itself is a choice; for one
can doubt without choosing to, but one cannot despair
without choosing. And when a man despairs he chooses
again--and what is it he chooses? He chooses himself,
not in his innnediacy, not as this fortuitous in~ vidual,
but he chooses himself in his eternal validity.

5

In .other ·words, until natural man realizes. the fallacy o:f clinging
to immanence he cannot come to faith in the Christian sense.

Despair

conditions man for the "leap o:f :faith." [lhomte summarizes it best
·when he writes:
The deeper the individual ·whose religiosity is human enters
into the God-relation, the more conscious he becomes of
the fact that he is bound in the finite. His experience
is paradoxical for the closer he gets to the Absolute the
more he realizes how distant he is :from it. Progress here
is tantamount to retrogression. He is unequal to the
task and the result is guilt-consiousness. This :fonn of
religiosity moves entirely within the realm of immanence;
there is therefore in this no breach with_nature.
On the other hand:
The Christian religiosity or the paradoxical religiosity
is altogether transcendental. It is based on the supposition that human nature is "the untruth," and that

2 5s~ren Kierkegaard, Either/0~, translated by Walter Lowrie
{New York: Double Dey & Company, Inc., Anchor Books, 1944), II, 215.

1
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personality a s such has become invalidated. There is thus
a definite breach between the Eternal and the human nature.
This religiosity is characterized by the fact that the
Divine ha s appeared in time and in historic fo~ of EE!:.
single individual in the personality of Jesus.2
When an adherent of Religion "A" recognizes the breach between
himself and the Eternal God, then
the consciousness of guilt is heightened to sin-consciousness t hrough the discovery that there has been an alteration
of human nature itself so that the truth is no longer found
wit hin but outside the personality. Sin-consciousness is
the only means of entrance to Christianity.27
Kie rkegaard urges the natural man to choose himself, that is to

natural man ma:y find himself as an "individual" and thus be open
to God's revelation.

Kierkegaard's position here seems analogous to

that of Elijah urging on the proph~ts of Ba'al.

28

Kierkegaard desperately wants the natural man to realize who
he really is, _and what his relati onship to God is.

He does not imply

t hat natural man has the pO'wer to believe as an act of his vi.11.

He

clearly states, "faith is a miracle," and "faith begins where thinking

26.rhomte, Philosophy, p. 213.
2 7Ibid., p. 2l4.

28r Kings 18.
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leave s off."

Furthermore, faith is not renunciation but affirmation.

"By f aith Abraham did not renounce his claim on Isaac, but by faith

he got Isaac." 29 Kierkegaard held that in life every movement which
30
brings about real change is a leap or act of freedom.
We set out in this section to describe the consciousness of
sin according to Kierkegaard.

It must seem that we have taken a long

detour int o the distinction between Religion "A" and Religion "B, ".
immanence and Christianity.

This detour was necessary as noted by

the distinction made by Thomte31 on the previous page.

The natural.

man clinging to his immanent religiosity can acquire a sense of guilt,
but he can not know that he is a sinner.

This is why Kierkegaard

can a ssert that the "concept of sin" distinguishes Christianity
32
most decisively from paganism.
Thus Kierkegaard affinns:
The individual is unable to acquire Sin-Consciousness by
hi msel f , as he can guilt -consciousness; for in guiltconsciousness the identi ty of the subject ~Ti.thin himself
is preserved, and guilt-consciousness is an alteration
of the subject ~Ti.thin the subject himself; sin-consciousness, on the other hand, is an alteration of the very
subject M.mself, which shows that outside of the individual
that power must be which makes clear to him the fact that
in coming into life he has become another than that he
33
wa~, has become a sinner. This power is the Deity in time.

29Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, pp. 77, 64, 59.
30Thomte, Philosophy, p. 58.
31-supra, p. 52, n. 27
32supra, p.

48, n. 20.

33ia.erkegaard, The Concluding Unscientific Postscript, p. 517.
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The foregoing should suffice to demonstrate the sharp distinction
which Kierkegaard makes between the religiosity of immanence and
paradoxical Christianity.
Selfhood
In the Confessions we discovered a pervading influence that
consistently viewed man as the creature and God as the Creator.

Since

the Fall man is a corrupted creature, unable to initiate communion
with God, lost apart from God's grace and faith which God works in
man to apprehend His grace.
from God to man.
is introspective.

The perspective of the Confessions moves

Kierkegaard reverses the approach.

His perspective

Because Kierkegaard deviates from the traditional.

approach, because he views man dialectically, and because some fail
to keep his distinction between the religiosity of immanence and
transcedent Christianity in min~ he can be misunderstood.

s.

U. Zuidema's verdict on Kierkegaard's understanding of man

is an apt illustration.
Human existence is, therefore, a free spontaneous inner
act; it is man's free realization of himself. In and
through such voluntary acts man is his own "father. 11 His
life lies in his own hands. In freedom he disposes .of his
Ol·m future and his own future being; in free self·
11
actualization he is the free cause of his "becoming.
The transition from a possible to a real act is the result
of an act of choice. At the basis of the whole of human
existence lies a choice made by the self.
Human freedom, as the director of self-realization, has
within its own typical existential pathos, its own
existentia;L passion. This passion is connected with "the
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f act " that man is simultaneously finite and infinite,
temporal and eternal, reul and ideal, relative and
absol ute. Man is a tension between finitude and infinity,
betwe en temporality and eternity, between the relative
and t he absolute, and a s such he is simultaneously the
uni ty and the opposition, the contact and the conflict,
t he synthesis and the struggle between these intrinsic
polar opposites. Human ·existence consists of this
tension; its task as finite existence is to realize
itself as an infinite self, to extend its bounds beyond
all limits, thereby tra.~scending all finiture. This
director of human existence gives human passion its
i mpetus, making it into an infinite passion. It arouses
an existential dialectical movement through which selfdeni al (denial of one's self as finite), is simultaneously
self-e.lection ( choice of one's self as infinite), selfdisclosure is concurrently self-affirmation, and existential
spontaneity is sel f -transcedence, in which man climbs
above himself. Man's passion may be described as his
anxious concern to attain his own infinity, his absolute
self, and his eternal salvation.34
T'nis parody of Kierkegaard demonstrates that Kierkegaard's
dialectical view of the self needs to be approached with care.
Unlike traditi onal understanding pf man, Kierkegaard posits
fre edom as anterior to self'hood.
selfhood becomes possible.

Freedom is the catalyst vherein

It is his contention that no one can

know the meaning of his ovn existence except from the perspective
of revelation.

Hence his emphasis focuses on the individual and what

it means to exist coram Deo.
Man is indeed, a synthesis of time and eternity.
the junction of nature and spirit.
is bound and yet free.

He stands at

He is a riddle to himself.

His existence is a paradox.

He

Kierkegaard

34s. u. Zuidema, Kierkegaard, translated by David H. Freeman
(Gran~ Rapids: The Baker Book House, 1960), pp. 15, 16.

contends that paradox is the category which expresses the relationshi p between man and God.

If one leaves God out of the picture, then

man can be understood in some other way.
self-understandi'ng.

But to do so falsifies man's

If one makes God immanent, and thus resolves the

paradox, then God is misunderstood.

If one misunderstands God, one

eo i pso misunderstands man.35
The paradox of human existence is best sunmiarized by this statement: Man is absolutely free and at the same time man is absolutely

I

determined.36 Man is part of nature and thus of its chain of·
determinacies--that is his involvement in time.

Yet man stands

outside of this stream in the transcendence of his freedom.

With the

mystery of his free will he can break the chain and control his destiny,
as it would appear to him and as he would like it to be absolutely.37
He is not unwittingly carried along in a determined process like a twig in a torrent, nor is he safely guided by
instinct like the bird that builds its nest in the spring.
He is called upon to guide his own destiny and yet he is
unable to do so. It is out of this anxiety (or dread)
which is the constant concomitant of hi~ freedom that
both creativity and rebellion are born. 8

35Martin J. Heinecken, The Moment Be:fore God (Philadelphia:
Muhlenberg Press, 1956), p. 153. Hereaf'ter referred to as Heinecken,
Moment.
36Ibid., p. 154.
37rbid., p. 165.
38:rbid.
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For Kierltegaard "dread before nothingness" is the constant concomitant of freedom in human existence and the psychological state out of
which sin is born.

If man were a beast or an angel, he would not be

able to be in dread.

But since man is a synthesis of eternity and

t ime; since man stands at the juncture of nature and spirit he can be
in dread, and the greater the dread, the greater the man.39
Kierkegaard does not operate ,Tith n simple body-soul dualism,
assigning to the soul rational powers, v:i.e•,ring it as the essence of
wan and giving it an essential freedom o~posed by the body as a
restricting factor.

If Kierkegaard had assumed this view, then

man's predicament would be merely his involvement infinitude, his
imprisonment in the body.

To the extent then that man could free

himself from the limitations of his body, to that extent he would
be free.

Absolute freedom comes when the soul leaves the body if

one accepts this approach.

But,

. This would be granting to the soul an essential autonom;y
and freedom, such as on Kierkegaard's view, only God
possesses. Such a being would overcome the dread of its
existence precisely to the degree that it recovered its
autonom;y and asserted its own freedom. In Kierkegaard 5
view, this is precisely vrhat the human self cannot do.

4

vrnat then is the self? To understand this it is necessary to
combine what Kierkegaard says about the n~ture of selfhood in The

39Ibid., p. 166~
40Ibid., p. 169.
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Si ckne s s unto Death ,Tith what he says about the dread as the
psychological state preceding the leap into sin in The Concept of
Dread.
Man i s spirit. But ·what is spirit? Spirit is the self.
But what is the self? The self is a relation which rel at e s i t se)..f to its own self, or it is that in the
r el ation [i.,hich accounts for it] that the relation relates
i t sel f to its o,m self; the self is not the relation but
[consi sts in the fact] that the relation relates itself
t o its own self.41
Although at fir st this statement sounds as though someone
scrambled the words in translation, it means that human beings are
diffe rent f rom animals in that they can recognize their o,m selfhood.
A horse f or example can not contemplate the advantages of being·· a

horse r at her t han a mule.
and contemplate ourselves.

As human beings we can stand outside ourselves
This is possible because: "Man is a syn-

t hes is of the infinite and the finite, of the temporal and the
eternal, of f reedom and necessity, in short a synthesis. 1142 Hence
t he self is that which is capable of relating to itself, a center of
cont empl at i on and responsibility.

In the human self this self is

inseparable from the synthesis of the temporal and eternai. 43
Kierkegaard regards the human self as a creature of God, a derived
and dependent self.

In fact, he asserts that a healthy· ·relationship to

41K1erkegaard, The Sickness unto Deat h, p. 146.
42Ibid.
43Heinecken, Moment, p. l7l.
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t he self requires recognition of man's dependent relationship to God.
Thus he affirms: "The self ca.nnot of itself attain and remain in
equilibriu.~ and rest by itself, but only by relating itself to that
Power which constituted the whole relation. 1144

Hence the God-relation-

shi p must be right if the relationship of the self to itself is to be
right.

This appears to be Kierkegaard's equivalent of Saint

Augustine's "lvla:-i's soul is restless until it rests in God."

Failure

to ground our life in God as the Power that posits it is despair
whether recognized or not. 4 5
The ver-y fact that man can despair is indicative of his superiority
over animals .

The consciousness of despair is the first step toward

effecting a cure.

The cure is faith in the atonement. 46

Consequently, I4erkegaard posits that the "self is the conscious
sY1:thesis of infinitude and finitude which relates itself to itself,
whose task is to become a self, a task which can be performed only
by means of a relationship to God. 1147 To this he adds: "The self is
in sound health and free from despair only when precisely by having
been in despair, it is grounded transparently in God. 1148 ·

4~ierkegaard, The Sickness unto Death, p. 147.
45 Ibid.
46Heinecken, Moment, p. 175.
47Kierkegaard, The Sickness unto Death, p. 162.
48Ibid., p. 163.
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For Kierkegaard the self has infinite significance because its
measure is God.

Consc i ousness of God is necessary before the self

recogni zes its i nfinitude.
The mor e conception
the more conception
de f inite individual
onl y t hen is it t he
s ins before God.49

Hence:

of God, the more self; the more self,
of God. Only when the self as this
is conscious of existing before God,
infinite self; and then this self

This introduces us to Kierkegaard's dialectical view of the self.
A self t hat is in one sense completely free whereas it is completely
dete rmined.

Human existence is a paradox.
Freedom

Dread is the inescapable concomitant of freedom.

Dread is

possible only for human beings who are syntheses of eternity and time~
Only dependent selves are capable of dread.
He is the ground of hi s ovm being.

God is not in dread, for

But ·we who are subject to both

freedom and necessity are in dread.
It is thus that dread is the psychological state preceding
the "leap" into sin. The biblical story of the fall into
si n is to be interpreted in this "!.·Tay. Adam' S story is to
be regarded a s the c onnnon htunan story. It is not to· be an
explanat ion of how sin crone into the ,mrld out of an original
state of abstract freedom and original integrity. Sin
al ways enters by a leap out of the psychological state of
dread. Furthermore, sin always presupposes itself, so that
you cannot put your finger on the state of innocence, either
in the history of the individual or in the history of the

49Ibid., p. 211.
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race. It is always the man ,iho is guilty already, who
has already lost his innocence, who begins wondering
about the origin of sin.50
Here again in Heinecken's sympathetic approach to Kierkegaard
we see how ine:Ktricably sin, particularly original sin, and human
freedom are bound together.

We noted this to be the case in the

Confessions understanding of free will.

But Kierkegaard's under-

standing of the Fall definitely departs from traditional orthodoxy.
In his view, Adam does not stand apart from the human race completely
free and innocent, capable of choosing equally either good or evil.
This would presuppose a knowledge of good and evil which Adam did
not have until af'ter the Fall as the biblical account pictures it.
Prior to his choice Adam could have no knowledge of the meaning of
either the tempt~r's spurious promise or God's threat.
Kierkegaard reinterprets the fall.

Hence

To do so, Kierkegaard attempts

to project himself into Adam's position prior to the fall.
This state he claims is analogous to the psychological state
preceding any choice.

This is the state of being aware of freedom,

of the ability to act, to choose without having yet ma.de the choice.
This state is dread, anxiety, the object of which is precisely the
unknmm.

It is the dread of "nothing," the awareness of the alarming

possibility of being able.

Of what he is able man has no knowledge.

To suppose he has, is to presuppose what comes later, the distinction

50Heinecken, Moment, p. 175, 176.
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between good and. evil. 5l Thus Kierkegaard terms dread

11

sympathetic

antipathy and antipathetic sympathy11 by which he means that we are both
attracted and repelled by the possibility.

Heinecken sums up Kierke-

gaard's view when he writes:
Thus out of the state of dread, which is the constant
concomitant of freedom, sin is born. It is not given with
existence. Man is not created a sinner, but he is created
a self--a synthesis of freedom and necessity in dread of
the possibilities his freedom opens before him. Thus he
stands at the place of decision and, since he is a dependent being, his well-being really depends upon his surrender
to the being upon whom he depends. I:f he properly surrendered
in trust all would be well with him. But as a matter of
f act he does not. Therefore every human being is aware o:f
the sinister contradiction with himself: He is aware o:f his
guilt in some measure or other, he is aware of his insecurity,
he is aware of his limitations, and he t ries frantically
to overcome them. He is thus always trying to live out of
hi mself and the world, out of his :finitude, out of his selfsufficiency. He is asserting himself in pride and is mistrustful of the limitations that are placed upon him. Thus
life circles about himself. This would be well enough, if
he really were his own center. But since he is a sel:f
constituted by another, this notion about himself throws him
horribly out of kilter. This is the state in which every man
is found, having entered into it ~ an inexplicable leap out
of the dizziness of his freedom. 5
.
Thus if Heinecken's observation is valid, Kierkegaard views
freedom as the medium through which man sins and through which he
comes to a consciousness of his sin and is thus reclaimed by God.

51 s~ren Kierkegaard, The Concept of Dread, translated by Walter
Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944), p. 40. Hereaf'ter
referred to as Kierkegaard, Dread.
52Heinecken, Moment, p.

179.

Martin observes that
Kierkegaard was a passionate apostle of ma.n's individual
freedom. But he perceived that the relation of faith to
/
freedom is a highly dialectical one. The act of Christian
faith is a personal decision of the human will; but, at
I
the same time, it is more. It is conditioned by the divine r'
determ:i.nation of the individual thr ough the Holy Spirit.
"No man can say that Jesus is the Lord but by the Holy
f
Ghost" (1 Corinthians 12:3). In this, the act of faith
corresponds to the paradoxical nature of the object of
1
faith, so that, from the hUJ11.an side, Christian faith is
\
an act of human decision; while, from the Divine side,
\
it is the free gift of God's grace.53

I

There can be little doubt about Kierkegaard's dialectical understanding of human freedom.

Like sin, freedom is because it is.

There can be no logical explanation for it.

The opposite of freedom

is not necessity, but ultimately guilt.
When sin is posited in the particular individual by the
qualitative leap, the distinction is then posited between
good and evil. We have nowhere been chargeable with the
foolishness of thinking that w.an must sin; on the contrary,
we have everywhere protested against"every sort of merely
experimental knowledge, and have said, what we here again
repeat, that sin presupposes itself, just as freedom does,
and cannot be explained, any more than freedom can, by an..v
antecedent. To let freedom commence as a liberum arbitrium
(which nowhere is to be found, as Leibnitz says), which is
quite as free to choose the good as the evil, is to ma.~e
ever-y explanation radically impossible. To talk about good
and evil as objects of freedom is to finitize both freedom
and the concepts of good and e1~· Freedom is infinite and
does not arise out of anything.

I...\1·"-

This approach to freedom makes speculation about its origin out
of bounds to reason, for reason certainly is not infinite.

5~rtin, The Wings of Faith, p.
54iu:erkegaard, Dread, p. 100.

93.
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"relig ious genius" may by turning inward discover guilt e.nd freedom,
not freedom to do this or that in the world, but "freedom to know
of himself that he is freedom."

However,

In t he degree that he discovers freedom, in that same
degree does the dread of guilt in the condition of possibili ty i mpend over him. Guilt only does he fear, for
t hat is t he one and only thing that can deprive him of
f reedom. It is easily seen that freedom is not defiance
by any means, or the selfish liberty understood in a finite
sense. By such an assumption (that of liberum arbitri~
t he effort has o~en been made to explain the origin of sin.
That, however, is labor lost, for the assumption of' such a
presupposition presents a greater difficulty than that
which it would explain. W'nen freedom is so interpreted,
i ts opposite is necessity, which shows that freedom has
be en construed under an intellectual category. No, the
opposite of freedom is guilt, and it is the supreme glory
of f r e edom that it has only with. itself to do, that it
projects guilt in its possibility and also posits it by
itself, and if guilt is posited actually, freedom still
posits it by itself. If one does not give heed to this,
then one has confounde~ freedom with something entirely
different, with force.55
Here we see the consistency of Kierkegaard.

He has given the

self a religious orientation and now he gives freedom this same
religious orientation.

Freedom is an existential category, not

merely an intellectual one.

As such it is not a logic·a l concept,

but a condition describing and defining existence.

Kierkegaard's

concept of freedom lies beyond the reach of logical analysis in the
realm of the spirit.

Hence he adds:

When freedom then fears guilt, it is not that it fears
to recognize itself as guilt, if it is guilty, but it fears
· to become guilty, and therefore, so soon as guilt is

55Ibid., p.

97.

posited, freedom comes back again as repentance. But
meanwhile freedom's relation to guilt is a possibility.
• • • Only by itself can freedom learn g know whether
it is f reedom or guilt which is posited.

5

Dread, already described as a concomitant of freedom, shows itself
as a "dizziness" in the practical psychological functioning of freedom
in the life of ~.an .
Thus, dread is the dizziness of freedom which occurs when
the spirit would posit the synthesis, and freedom then
gazes do~m into its o\m possibility, grasping at finiteness
to sustain itself. In this dizziness freedom succumbs.
Further t han this psychology cannot 6 0 and will not.
That very instant everything is c hanGed, and when freedom
rises again it sees that it is guilty. Between these two
instants lies the leap, which no science has explained or
can explain. He who becomes guilty in dread becomes as
ambiguously guilty as it is possible to be • • • • Psychologi ca lly speaking, the fall into sin always occurs in
impotence. s·r
This is not an attempt to explain tne origin of human freedom,
rather it is an attempt to describe its symptoms in our existence.
It leads us back into the reaJJn of the spirit.

Kierkegaard observes

at the conclusion of his study on dread that as soon as psychology
has finished with dread it must deliver it over to dogmatics.

For

"he who with respect to guilt is educated by dread will therefore
repose only in atonement."
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Kierkegaard's concept of hUIJ".an freedom is clarified by this
comment from Thomte:

56Ibid.

57Ibid., p. 55.
5Sibid~, p. 145.
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Freedom does not consi st i n being eC;_11ally able to choose
good and evil. Good and evi l are r.o~ regarded as determi nants of freedom but as derivatives. First, "when sin
is _posited in the particu.1.:-.r by the qualitative leap, the
distinction is then posit(; .... oetween good and evil. 11 Bohlin
points out the difference between Kant's and Kierkegaard's
conception of freedom. For Kant the result of the ethical
striving of t he will is a progression toward ethical perfection. For Kierkegaard the result of the same striving is
a consciousness of guilt which rnakes it apparent that the
salvation resulting in a new life must come ~rough a
spiritual ;;,ower which is greate·r than man I s.

5

Hu.man freedom for Kierkegaard is the context of our life in
which God brings us to an awareness of our sin and impotence.

And

it is God who is the teacher.
T'ne Teacher is then God himself, who in acting as an
occa sion prompts the learner to recall that he is in
Error, and that by reason of his 01-.rn guilt. But this
state, the being in Error by reason of one 1 g o,m guilt,
what shall we call it? Let us caJ.l it Sin. 0
This brings us full circle, back to the consciousness of sin.
We wa.>1t to look at sin now not as an act of willful disobedience,
but as a condition of our existence.
Sin--Fallen Freedom
The Confessions make a distinction between the creature and the
creature's corruption due to sin.

Kierkegaard's dialectical approach

at times seems to equate finitude with sin, but this is not so.

59Thomte, Philosophy, p.

Rather

167.

60s~ren Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments, translated by David
F. Swenson (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1936), p. 10.

he maint ains that everyone who exists is a sinner because man has
abused his freedom.

Man does not sin from necessity--this is a con- /
I

tradiction.

He sins only in freedom.

This is part of his definition.

Given with existence are two possibilities:
The one is the leap into sin, the grasping to finitude in
the assertion of a false independence: the other is the
surrender in faith. It is the failure to surrender in
faith that constitutes man a sinner and makes him guilty.
61
No one has said this more unequivocally than Kierkegaard.
But such a position is paradoxical.

It defies systematization.

It proposes an existential sit uation which can only be recognized by
one who has experienced what it means to be a sinner in the light of
Christ.

Thus Kierkegaard holds that it is only as man is confronted

by the love of God in Christ that he recognizes the f'u1.J. dimension

of his sin.
Even in the subsequent state of sin dread remains.

The fall into

sin is not just a past event, but a constantly recurring action in
the life of each individual.

Everyone is confronted by two possi-

bilities of existence, either to receive his life from God in trust, or·
to assert himself in a false independence.

This is the constant

threat or "crisis 11 in which man stands before the abyss, the threat
of meaninglessness and insecurity, from which a man is always tempted
to escape into something that he can control and manipulate.

61Heinecken, Moment, p. 183.
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Ibid., p. 184.
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Heinecken sunnnarizes the nature and function of dread in these
words:
Dread is the dizziness of freedom which is the constant
concomitant of the freedom of the self which is a synthesis
of freedom and necessity. Out of this psychological state
sin is born ' by a leap. This dread is dread of the unknown,
of the mere possibility of being able, out of which state
a man grasps at finitude or overreaches himself in some wa;y
and finds that he is guilty, that he is in contradiction
with himself and the author of his being. After having
thus become a sinner a person is educated by dread more and
more. That is to say, the possibilities of his freedom
are explored imaginate1y . . . The only escape from
dread is in faith • • • • 63
It will prove helpful to keep this summary definition in mind so
that dread is not confused with despair.
despair is?

Dread is not itself sin, but

Dread is the antecedent state to despair or sin.

Dread

has to do with ignorance, sin has to do with knowledge •
.Just as the self was involved in dread so the self is also involved
in despair or sin.

For Kierkegaard the true self exists only in the

consciousness of its dependent relationship to God.

This he calls

being "grounded transparently 11 in God or t he Power who posits our
life.

The ll;rans:9arency" is the awareness of' God as the source of our

existence, and the rejection of self-deception.

"The self no longer ·

mistrusts or misconstrues this Power, he rests in it as an inexhaustible
wellspring of boundless ~d unconditional love. 1164
The self is confronted with choice, the "either or"--faith or sin.

63Ibid., p. 186.
64
~ - , p. 188,

189.

But the self is already in sin.

And this is a bondage from which the

self is impotent to achieve release.
man .

This is the inescapable lot of

He c annot get around it no:c can he get out of it.

it he would have to get rid of himself.

To · get out of

To attempt to evade it,

fal sifies his relationship to God upon ·which his relationship to hims el f depends .

Paradoxically, man retains the freedom of his wilful

self - assertion without being able through self-assertion to become
his true s el f .

To become this, he must surrender his autonomy and

find his true f reedom in God who loves and accepts him. 6 5 This dovet ails wit h Kierkegaard's observation recorded in his Journals:
The most tremendous thing which has been granted to man
i s : t he choice, freedom. And if you desire to save it
and preser ve it there is only one way: ih the very same
second unconditionally and in ~omplete res~nation to
give it back to God, and yourself ,,Tith it.
"'! an can be in despair/sin vTithout being conscious of it.

There

are vari ous kinds of despair, such as despai r of infinity, despair of
f initude, despair of possibility, fatalism, and others.

They all

represent the logical pos·sibilities that stem from the nature of man's
self es a synthesis of the infinite and the finite, of possibility and
necessity.
Man's basic sin is his failure to recognize his dependence upon
God and hence his ref'usal to live out of God.

65Ibid.,

.p.

Instead substitutes

189.

66Robert Bretall, A Kierkegaard Anthology (Princeton: Princeton
University Press,

1951), p. 428.
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like self, world, flesh, and law replace God.

This is the despair of

weakness ·which can be silllll'llarized under the category of s·e lf-acceptance:
This whole matter of the despair c f weakness can be reduced
to the question of self-accepta.~ce. It is not just a matter
of accepting what fortune . gives or denies to you, because
then a man ·would be falling in and out of despair with the
changes of fortune. It is a matter of accepting oneself
as a limited and finite self, just as one is, while never
forgetting the possibilities of the infinite. In order to
do this properly, however, one must see oneself as not~ing
before God and yet accepted of him. 67
Kierkegaard expresses the connection between despair and sin in
this way:
Sin i s this: before, • • • to be in despair at not
willing to be oneself, or in despair at willing to be
oneself. Thus sin is potentiated wea.lmess or potentiated
defiance: sin is the potentiation of despair.68
Since Kierkegaard views human existence as existence before God,
sin has grave consequences.

A cl~ar conception of God underlines the

harsh reality of human sin, for only as

'we

can we really recognize sin's seriousness.

know God's love in Christ
Sin, therefore, is

never merely the breaching of an impersonal law, but it is always before
God.

T'.nis emphasis is refreshingly like Luther.
The self is always before God, and apart from faith the self' is

in despair.

Since the self is before God, the despair in which the

self exists is also before God. · This is the condition out of which
sinful acts are born:

67Heinecken, Moment, p.

2o8.

~ierkegaard, The Sickness unto Death, p. 208.

Nor is it only now and then one sins before God; for every
sin is before God, or rather it is this which properly makes
hu.Tl!E.n guilt to be sin.
Despair is potentiated in proportion to consciousness of
self; but the self is potentiated when God is the measure. ·
The more conception of God, the more self, the more self,
the more conce:ption of God. Only ·when the self as this
definite individual is conscious of existing before God,
only then i~ it the infinite self; and then this self sins
before God. 9
The Confessions view original sin as the ignorance of God.
Kierkegaard too attempts to relate sin and ignorance, but in a different way.

Heinecken sums u:p his argument in the words:

The Socratic definition of sin is ignorance. The Socratic
contention is that men do the wrong only because they are
ignorant of the right, and that no one would deliberately
do what he knows to be wrong. This raises the very
interesting point as to how this ignorance first crune to
be? How a nan's knowledge of the good first crune to be
obscured? If the first time he sinned a man was not
distinctly conscious of what he was doing, there must
have been a prior obfuscation of this intelligence. This
is not accounted for. If, on the other hand, he wa.s clearly
conscious of what he was doing, either he ·would never have
fallen into sin, or else sin must lie not in the intelligence
but in the defiant .,ill. This is what Christianity asserts.
If the Socratic view is correct then, by definition, sin
does not exist at all.70
Kierkegaard was a great admirer of Socrates, but here we see him
parting company with his mentor because of his Christian convictions.
Kierkegaard's view shows clearly his endeavor to place sin at the door
of will rather than at the step of reason.

69Ibid., p. 211.

70Heinecken,· Moment, p. 21.
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Kierkegaard connects sin and the will.

If the Confessions regarded

r eason anterior to will, Kierkegaard seems to reverse this order and
make will ant ecedent to r eason .

Note the progression of his logic in .

t hi s pas sage .
Chr i stianit y begins als o in another way, by declaring that
the re must be a reve lation f r om God in order to instruct
man a s t o what sin i s , t hat sin does not consist in the
fact t hat man has not understood what is right, but in the
f act that he will not understand it, and in the fact that
he ·will not do it.
Socrates expl ains t hat he who does not do the rig ht things
has not understood it; but Christianity goes a little further
back and s,a ys, it is because .he will not understand it, and
this i n turn i s because he doe s not ··rill the right. And
in the next pl ace , desc:d bing what :properly is defiance, it
teaches that a man does wrong although he understa.11ds what
is right, or for bears to do rieht el.though he understands
what is right; in short, ·the Christian doctrine of sin is
pure impertinence against man, accusation upon accusation • • • •

But c an anyone comprehend this Christian doctrine? By no
means--this too is Christian, and so is an offence. It must
be beli e ved. Compr ehension is conterminous with man's relat ion t o t he human, but faith is man's relation to the divine.
How t hen does Christiani ty expl ain this incomprehensible?
Quite consist ently, in an equally incomprehensible way, by
means of the fact that it is revealed.
So then , Christianity underst ood, sin l i es in the will, not
in the intellect; and. this corruption of the will goes well
beyond t he consciousness of the individual. This is the
perfectly consistent declaration, for otherwise the question
of how sin began must arise with respect to each individual. 71
This leaves little doubt as to the freedom Kierkegaard assigns to
the human will in matters of faith.
to def'y God.

Natural man is free to sin, free

His reason cannot even comprehend the nature and

71Kierkegaard, The Sickness unto Death, p. 226.

I
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significance of this defiance in relationship to God.
Since the self is a paradox, it follows logically that sin is also
paradoxical.

Sin i.., an absolute paradox which can neither be resolved

nor explained .

It can only be acknowledged, confessed and repented of'.

Revelation must teach us what sin is!
No man by himself and of himself can explain what sin is,
pr ecisely because he is in sin. All his talk about sin is
at bottom palliation for sin, an excuse, a sinful w~tigation.
Hence Cnristianity begins also in another way; by declaring
that there must be a revelation from God in order to instruct
man as to what sin is, that sin does not consist in the fact
that man has not understood what is right, but in the fact
that he ·will not understand it and in the fact that he will not
do it.72
Kierkegaard makes no apology about this position being offensive
to ma.n's reason.

He dwells on the

11

offense" of Christianity and

places it in sharp focus:
Here again ,.~e have the criterion of t !'!e offense. The possibility of the offense consists in the fact that there has
to be a revelation from God to enlighten man as to what sin
is and how dee p it l ies. The natural man, the paga.'1, thinks
thus: "Oh well, I admit that I have not understood everything
in heaven and earth • • • • I don't pretend to be a perfect
man, far from it; but I know and. I am ·willing to concede how
far I am from perfection--ought I not then to know what sin
is?" But Christianity makes a.'1 answer, "No, that is what you
know least about, how fe.r you are from perfection and what
sin is. 11 Behold, in this sense, in a Christian sense, sin
doubtless i~ ignorance; it is ignorance of what sin is.
The definition of sin
•• still needs to be completed: sin
is, af'ter having been informed by a revelation from God what

72rbid., p. 225, 226.
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sin is, then before God in despair not to will to be oneself, or before God in despair to will to be oneself.73
Kierl<:ega o.rd definitely agrees with traditional orthodoxy that
sin is not just a negation.
ignorance , or finitude.
J'J'l.an 's: existenc e .

It's not just a lack, a weakness,

It is a position.

Sin is the orientation of

It is the inclination of his will.

Since this is

true, sin cannot be explained, but must be experienced.
Christianity, we have insisted from the beginning, is not
a philosophical or theological doctrine but an existential
connnunication in which t he paradox plays an essential role.
Though Christianity is not a doctrine, nevertheless it
involves dogmas, the revealed dogmas, which are ·to be
affirmed. Strictly speaking , of course, it is not the dogma
which is believed, it is the God to whom the dogma points
who is believed and trusted~ Nevertheless there is the
revealed do[Wla, that which is affirmed on the basis of
revelation.·r4
This is how Heinecken interprets Kierkegaard.

His distinction

between dogma and doctrine seems confusing, but its validity would
depend upon his definition.

Without a doubt, Kierkegaax_-d does tie

paradox, faith, and dogma together as the three determinants that
stand in support of the Christian doctrine of sin and act as a bulwark
against pagan wisdom.75 There is no denying, either, the major role
that is played by the concept "paradox" in Kierkegaard's thought.

The

paradox must be lived and experienced, because by its very nature it

73Ibid., p. 226, 227.
7 4Heinecken, Moment, p. 222.
75Kierkegaard, The Sickness Unto Death, p. 227.
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transcends our understa~ding and cannot be reasoned through or
intellectually recognized.

No one dare claim to understand and

resolve t he mystery of his own sinfulness and the greatness of his
mm r e demption.

The Atonement
The revel a·!::ion of mnn ' s involvement in sin is the ba.si s for the
doctri ne of t he atonement.

Kierkegaard points out that Christianity

i s a t pains to establish sin so firmly that it is impossible for man
~o rid himself of it.

Man stands guilty before God and only God

hims el f c an clear him of his guilt.

As

he strives to rid himself o:f

s in by his mm devices, man only compounds his predicament, working
himsel f deeper into despair and sin.

God alone can help him.76

Fir st Chr i sti anity gees ahea d and establishes sin so
secur e l y a s a posi t i on that t he human understanding never
can comprehend it; and t hen it is the same Christian
doctr i ne whi ch in turn undertakes to do away with this
position so completely that the hu-rnan underst anding never
can comprehend it. Speculation, which chatters itself
away fro.rn t he paradoxes, lops a little bit off at both
ends, a nd so it goes easier; it does not make sin so
entirely posit ive--and i n spite of this it cannot get it
t hrough its head that sin should be entirely forgotten.
But Christianity, ·w hich is the first discoverer of the
par a doxes, is in this case also as :paradoxical as possible;
it works directly against itself when it establishes sin
so securely as a position that it seems a perfect impossibility to do away with it a.gain--and then it is precisely
Christianity which, by the atonement, would do away with
it so completely that it is as though drowned in the sea. 77

6
7 Heinecken, Moment, p. 222.
77Kierkegaard, The Sickness unto Death, p. 231.
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Kierkegaard could have come to this understanding from Luther's
Small Catechi sm for certainly this emphasis is apparent in Luther's
explanation of t he Apostl es' Creed.

The cure of sin, the sickness unto

death , comes t hrough faith in the God who i n Christ has reconciled
the world t o Himself and who is pr esent and active in His church
t hr ough His· s pirit.

"The true image of God, true sel:fhood, true

humanity, is attai ned when, in the proper relationship to this God, a
man wills to be the dependent self, the sinful self, the redeemed
sel:r.78
The a lternative to faith is offense.

It is the refusal to

accept the God who humbled himself to be the Savior of all in Jesus,
the Chr ist.
t his offense .

Even God Himself cannot eliminate the possibility of
Love cannot be forced, it must be freely given.

I n pagani sm man made God a man (The Man - God); in
Christianity God makes Himsel f man (The God - Man)--but
in the infinite love of His compassionate grace He made
nevertheless one stipulation, he can do no other. This
is pr ecisely t he so~row in Christ, "He can do no other";
He c an humble Hi mself, take the form of a servant, suffer
and di e f or man, invite all to come rn1to Him, sacrifice
every hour of the day, and sacrifice :His life--but the
possibility of the offense He cannot take away. Oh, uniq_ue
work of love ! Oh, unfathomable sorrow of' love! That God
Himself cannot , as in a.11other sense He does not 1,rill,
cannot ,·rill it, but, even i f He would, He could not make
it impossible that thi s work of love might not turn out
to be for a person exactly t he opposi t e , to be the extremest
mise ry! For the greatest possible human misery, greater

78Hei necken, Moment, p. 224.
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even than sin, is to be offended in Christ and remain offended.
And Christ cannot, "Lovell cannot render this impossible. Lo,
f or this reason He says, "Blessed is he who shall not be
offended in me." More he .cannot do.79
We conclude with Thomte's summary statement on Kierkegaard's
understanding of f aith, for faith alone can apprehend the atonement:
KierkePaard maintains that faith in the Christian sense is
neither continuous with rational belief nor to be identified
with a spont aneous awareness of God. Christian faith is
lithe second inunediacy" or "irnrnediacy af'ter reflection. 11
By the term innnediacy af'ter reflection he means exactly
what he formerly had called "repetition," namely the restoration of the personality to its pristine .integrity. However,
the immediate consciousness of God must be completely destroyed by the consciousness of sin before there can be any
question of a second inunediacy of God. Only when the individual has found himself guilty before God can he arrive at
faith and the nzy-stic union with God in Christ. The 11 reflection11 is here the precess by which the consciousness of sin
c ompletely destroys every possibility of finding God in
the inunediate experience of life.
Faith is not r egarded as a form of cognition. It is not an
intellectual observat ion but an expression of the will.
There is in Kierkegaard's concept of faith as well as in
his con pt of choice a pronounced tendency to,rard volun80 At the same time Kierkegaard maintains that
tarism.
faith and the new immediacy wi th God is a divj,ne gif't.
Faith is the transcendent point of departure.~1

79Kierkegaard, The Sickness unto Death, p. 257.
80
The Lutheran Cyclopedia, p. 1113, defines "voluntarism" as
11
the opposite of intelJ.ectualism. In philosophy, the attempt to
interpr et ultimate ITality in terms of will r ather than intellect.
In theolo~ the ba sing of moral and logical distinctions on the will
of Gon. r ather than on reason, i.e., whatever God ·w ills to be so is
on that· basis right, true, and good." Lutheran Cyclopedia, edited by
Erwin L. Lueker (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1954), p. lll3.
81
Thomte, Philosophy, p. 161.

It should be pointed out that when Ki erkegaard makes faith an
act of t he will he is consist en~, f or s i n i n his thought is also
an a ct of the will, and t he opposite of s in is not virtue but faith.8 2
The charge of voluntarism is frequently lodged against Kierkegaard
and ultimately becomes a question of definition.

And once the

def ini tion is established, then one must ask: Is voluntarism any
more a d istorti on of r eality than rationalism? · Conceivably, the
debat e could be lengt hy.
OBSERVATIONS
The time ha s now come to knot the thread, to use a favorite
expr es sion of Kierkegaard and attempt to make some observations on
his thought in t he areas just treated.

For perspective, Thomte 1 s

es t imate of Kierkegaard's contribution to theology might prove
helpf ul:

In t he author's estimate it is Kierkegaard's contribution
to have drawn a distinct line between all human religiosity
of :immanence and the Chr istian religiosity of transcedence.
The human individual does not possess the Truth, God himself
must reveal it to him. There is in Kierkegaard's philosophy
an absolute dualism or discontinuity between God and human
nature. This dualism is due to the fact that man is regarded
as a created and derived self, but more essentially it is due
to sin which is held to be a qualitative difference between
God and man. 8 3

82Kierkegaard, The Sickness unto Death, p. 213.
83Thomte, p . 214.
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Hi st ory without question endorses Thomte's verdict on Kierdegaard's
work .

It i s this particula r emphasis which was treated under the

sub-title "the consciousness of sin 11 which has led to some remarkable
r et h i nking of t wentieth cent ury theology.
We began our f oray i nto Kierkegaard. with the idea expressed in
the int r oduction t hat Kierdegaard viewed his work as a corrective
t o rat i onalism , i dealism, a nd nominal orthodoxy.
up a~ a correct i ve?

How does he measure

Thus Kierkegaard's o~m standard shall be the

nonn of measurement in these brief obser vations.
Kierkegaar d 's subjective approach makes analysis difficult.
Since he t reat s both fre edom and sin as existential categories,
pinning down his meaning i n a logica l framework meets with only
partial success.

He himself made it quite clear that a logical

syst em i s poss ible but an existential system is not.

84

T'ne s i gn i ficance of Kierkegaard's insistence on the distinction
b et ween t he religiosity of immanence and paradoxical Christianity
cannot be overst ated.

That Kierkegaard should maintain that a

consciousness of sin cannot be achieved by reason is a blow at
t he heart of rationalism.

Any idealistic view of man is shattered

by the "abyss" separating man and God.

Unless one is content to

remain in the realm of immanence, Kierkegaard's argument shatters
all human pretence and presumption.

To become a Christian requires

84Kierkegaard, The Concluding Unscientific Postscript, pp.
99-113.
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God's a ct.

To posit another way is nothing but delusion and

unconscious despair.
Ki erkegaa r d ' s concept of selfhood is subjective.

It appears

aptly framed , however, for who can deny t hat man is a synthesis.
Like t he Confess i ons Ki erkegaard vi ews man as a whole rejecting
the Greek body-s oul dual i sm.

One's relationship to God as the

ba sis f or a he~lthy relationshi p to t he self is a valid conclusion.
One might question t he wisdom of making one ' s consciousness of
t he God relationship a prerequisite for pa rticipating in the
at onement .

Further study on how this position relates to infant

baptism a nd t he ob j ective va lidi ty of the means of grace seems
ca lled f or .
Ki erkegaard adopted t his position i n opposition to the nominal
orthodoxy of the sta te church where one born a Dane was automatically
a Luthe ran.

Apparently Kierkegaard viewed this with the same

fe e ling Lut heran theology views the ex opere operatio principle of
Roman Ca tholicism.

But as the "corrective" he may well overreach

himself in his understa nding of selfhood.
Kierkegaard's concept of freedom begins with a realistic
repudiation of the liberum arbitrium.

Since this abstraction does

not exist in reality and was devised simply so that freedom might
be treated logically we are left with paradoxical freedom.

Kierke-

gaard maintains that freedom's opposite is not necessity, but guilt
which thrusts freedom into the realm of spirit.

Good and evil for

ar
Kierkegaard are not determinants of f r eedom, but deri vatives.
Freedom fonns the matrix of s elfhood and of good and evil.
a nxi ety or dread is a concomitant of freedom.

Hence

To Kierkegaard

freedom i s t hat which enables man to sin, but also that ·which
enables him to recognize his sin a nd his need f or the atonement.
Thi s i s the heart of Kier kegaard's thinking on freedom and its
a ppeal is t hat it appears to square with our experience of life.
I f one follows his thinking carefully one will find that Kierkegaard
is very consistent in the application of his concept of freedom's
paradox ica l nature.
Sin i s t he condition of everyma.n's existence because all have
misused f r eedom.

The basic nature of sin is its refusal to

recognize God as the ground of being.

What else is this, than

a repetition i n different terminology of the Confessional doctrine
of the Creator--creature relationship?

This was Adam's sin,

a nd Adam's sin affirms Kierkegaard as a type of all men's sin.
~ei necken's interpretation gives one some insight into the implications of Kierkegaard's understanding of the Fall.
Moreover a state of innocence is not to be sought for
as an actual state at the beginning of the human race.
The so-called status integritatis, or state of integrity,
is never an actual historical state, but is the designation of the purpose for which man was created: to take
his life from God in trust, to come to rest in the power
that posited him, and to become the clear qhannel through
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which that power may flow. This was the one possibility which was given a man with his exi~tence. This
possibility was, however, never realized.~5
We h.ive designated Kierkegaard's concept of sin as "fallen
fre edom."

It is only just that we let him speak for himself con-

cerning sin's origin.
That account in Genesis is the only dialecti'cally consistent account. Really its whole substance is concentrated in the clause: Sin came into the world by a sin.
I f t his were not so, then sin would have come in as
something accidental, which man would do well not to try
to explain. The difficulty for the understanding is
precis ely the triumph of the explanation, its profound
consistency in representing that sin presupposes itself', .
that it so came into the 9rld that by the fact that
it is, it is presupposed. 0

8

Kierkegaard takes sin out of the realm of reason.

Sin is

despair at willing to be or.e's self' or at not willing to be one's
s e lf, naraely a fallen dependent creature of God.

Sin is the

potentiation of despair either in weakness or defiance.

Sin is

always against God and is measured by man's consciousnes~ of himself'
Which in turn is measured by his_ consciousness of God.

Kierke-

gaard's insights here are dynamic and open up a great area for
further study.
Thus one can see that Kierkegaard locates sin not in the mind,
but ultimately in the will.
Socrates.

Here he parts company with his mentor,

Sin, like the self is paradoxical.

85Heinecken,
·

Moment, p. 181.

86Kierkegaard, Dread, p. 29.

It cannot be

explained, it can only be confessed and repented of.

Attempts to

explain i t always distort it because t he interpreter is a sinner
himself.

It takes a r evelation o_

~~d

to make sin known.

Natural

ma n concerned only with a rel i g iosity of inunanence can comprehend
guilt, but not sin.

Sin is before God, and before one recognizes

his guilt as sin he needs to recognize that he is a "self" before
God . 87
The only solution to sin i s the atonement.

But the atonement

so defies reason that man's only possible response is either
faith or offence.

Even God in His love r evealed in Christ recog-

n i zes and respects man's fallen freedom and will not coerce accept a nce of His solution for the liberation of man's fallen freedom.
If one were to ask, what is the distilled essence of Kierkegaard1s concept of human freedom, this writer would respond:
Freedom is the catalyst in human nature through which God works
both the awareness of sin and the forgiveness of sin.

Freedom

is that in man which makes him liable to sin and yet subject to
the Atonement.
In t he next chapter an attempt at comparison of the Coni'essions'
view of free will and Kierkegaard's position -0n human freedom will
be made.

87supra, pp. 72 and 73.

CHAPTER IV
COMPARISON OF THE T'wO POSITIONS
-Sin with r esul tant en!'!i.~:cy a gainst God "is an inevitable
result of t he claim to autonomy, the claim implicit in the delusion
t ha t t here i s a "f ree will" (Liberum arbitrium).

But "moral

autonomy is destroyed as soon as there is a break with immanence
wh ich i s subject to the divine commandment. 111
In t his· chapt er we reach our primary objective.

Here we

compar e t he Confe s sional position of Lutheranism on free will
with Ki e r kegaard's position.

We will note the general similarities

and d i ffe rences between the two positions. ·
Introduction
It wi ll prove helpf ul to note some general similarities bef"Jre
we begi n consideri ng specif i c points.

This will make it possible

to see t he positions in perspective and enable us to be fair in
our comparison.
First, we should note that both the Confessions and Ki erkegaard
are attempting a corrective.

The Confessions present their

positio~ i n opposition to semi-Pelagianism and synergism, striving
for a clear distinction between civil righteousness and righteousness

\ 1erner ·E lert, The Structure of Lutheranism, translated by
Walter A. Hansen (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1962), I,

31, 25.

before God . 2

Kierkegaard strives to be a corrective to the nominal

orthodoxy of his day with its reduction of Christianity to a
rationalistic system of immanence.3

Both seek to correct the same

basic devi ation, the over-rating of reason and free will.
Secondly, both the Confessions and Kierkegaard view man as a
creature. 4

In the. Confessions the category

to any Christian understanding of man.
grant ed .
11

11

creature 11 is fundamental

Often this is taken for

But it may be also presupposed.

In Kierkegaard there is

an absolute discontinuity between God and human nature. 11

This

is due to the fact that man is regarded as a created and derived
self, but even more essentially it is due to sin which is held to
be the "qualitative difference between God and man. 11 5 This too
is the basic presu~position in Kierkegaard's approach to the
iinderstanding of human nature.
Thirdly, both the Confessions and Kierkegaard regard man as
a whole . 6 Kierkegaard caustically inveighs against the Hegelian
system that would consider man's thought or rationality apart from
his existence.

2

The wholeness of man is an important emphasis in

Supra, p. 23.

3supra, p. 53.
4

Supra, pp. 6-9, 59.

5Reidar Thomte, Kierkegaard's Philosophy of Religion (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1949), p. 214.
6
Supra, · p.

9,

p.

57.

86
our day. 7
Fina:.ly we need to note the difference in the approach between
the two positions.

The Confessions vi.-::,..; ·;;he subject of free will

from a theological perspective.

Philosophy and the problems

posed by t he question of free will from t he philosophical perspective remain in t he background. 8

On the other hand, Kierkegaard

is very much a•./'are of t he philosophical implications of his
position.

A key ·consideration in his stance is his opposition

to the current philosophical system of his day.

In summary,

/

we might say that the Confessions approach the subject of free
will from God 's point of view whereas Kierkegaard approaches it

,I .

i

from man's perspective.
Original Sin and the Consciousness of Sin
Both the Confessions and Kierkegaard treat original sin and
free will as two sides of the same coin.

The Confessions approach

the Fall as an historical act with continuing implications.
Kierkegaard, however, understands the Fali psychologically and views
it dynamically as a continuing reality in the life of each individual.
Here is an obvious difference in the two positions under scrutiny.
In the Confessions the Fall is understood as the cause of man's

7
~ , p. 117.

8
Supra, p. 23.
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natural inclination to sin.
t he Fall.

No attempt is made to psychologize

The Fall is simply termed "Adam's disobedience."

result of the Fall is the loss of the "Imago Dei. 11

The

The image of

God is equat ed with the concreated righteousness of man in his
prist ine state.

It included the gifts of knowledge of God, fear

of God, and trust in God.

T'ne effect of Adam's sin is passed

down to men by birth so that none except the Son of God can claim
exclusion from original sin.9
Kierkegaard, on .t he other ha~d, regards Adam's Fall as symbolic
of everyman 's fall, although he does not regard Adam as a mytholoe ical figure .

Kierkegaard. assumes . this position because he is

unwilling to admit that man sins from necessity.
in freedom.
faith .

Via.n sins only

Given with existence are two possibilities, sin or

Hence man either seeks to assert himself in a false inde-

pendence or he accepts his life from God in trust. 10 The atmosphere
surrounding man as he confronts this decision is one of dread
or anxiety.

Dread is the dizziness of rreedom poised on the

precipice of choice.

The dread that confronted Adam before the Fall

confronts man as he faces the choice of his dependent and sinful
nature before the holy and infinite God.

Thus Kierkegaard posits

for each descendent of Adam the possibility that traditional

9Supra, pp. 10-11.

10supra, p. 68.

,

8$
theology at t r ibuted to Adam alone.
Thi s does not mean that Kierkegaard ascribes to each individual
a t ime of i nnocen ce.
has fa llen !

No one can know what innocence is until he

Hence Kierkegaard can reject the notion that both

t he first Adam a nd any subsequent "adam" could freely choose between
good and evil.

As far as Kierkegaard is concerned, there is no

historica l s tate that anyone can point to as a state of innocence •.11
The Confe s sions mention man's corporate involvement in original
s in.

12

Kierkegaa rd does not.

His concer n is with the individual.

He is also concerned with keeping Adam a member of the human race
and t hus s ubject to the a t onement made by the "last Adam," Jesus
Chris t.

Here we find a significant variation in Kierkegaard's

theol ogy a nd warrants further study.
The Co~essions distinctly define t he nature and effect of
orig i nal sin in both its positive and negative aspects.

The loss

incurred as a result of the Fall includes both the original
relationship of harmony with and knowledge of God, and the inclination to sin.

Thus original sin is more than the sum total of

man's actual sins.

Even if a man were not to commit sin, he

would still be involved in original sin.

Thus no one is godly.

Sin is ~iversa1. 13 By analogy Kierkegaard points to man's

llsupra
_ , p. 81.
12Supra,
p.
l3Ibid.

14

continuing in sin as man's worst sin.

He accepts the traditional

dogma that sin is not merely a negation but a position. 1 4 He
views actual sins as the outward occasicn for observing the momentum of origina l sin.

For Kierkegaard sin is the decisive category

of Christianity, for sin mus t be recognized before the atonement
has a ny meaning.

Man's creatureliness and especially man's sin

account for th~ infinite qualitative gulf between man and God. 15
Like Luther and the Confessions, Kierkegaard draws no distinct
boundary between original sin and actual sin.
Luther:

11

Pinomaa observed of

There is very little difference between original sin and

actual sin as far as Luther is concerned. 1116

In fact, Kierkegaard's

view of the Fall appears to eliminate any practical distinction
between original and actual sin.

It would seem that Kierkegaard

would posit actual sin as the act that catapults man into ·
solidarity with the race of sinful humanity for all do sin.

On

the other hand, the relationship between original sin and actual
sin in the Confessions appears to be that of cause and effect.
Actual sin is evidence of the fact of original sin.
Both the Confessions and Kierkegaard acknowledge original sin

14supra, pp. 68-71.
l5Supra, pp.

66, 67.

16Lennart Pinomaa, Faith Victorious, translated by Walter
Kukkonen (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1963), p. 64.
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as guilt.

Kie rkegaard could hardly deny this in view of his under-

standing of t he Fall and hence of original sin.

He cites with

approval t he Smalcald Article s in The Concept of Dread:

"This

heredita ry sin is so deep a corruption of human nature that reason
cannot understa nd it.

I~ must be believed because of the revela-

tion in t he Scriptures. 111 7
Even in t he rea lm of the religion of immanence Kierkegaard
does not o:pera te without the concept of "original" sin.

18 However,

in this realm man merely recognizes his guilt; he fails to see that
his guilt is sin, namely guilt before God.
Both the Confessions and Kierkegaard emphasize the God.ward
dimension of sin.

Sin is enmity against God evidenced by such

attitudes and actions as ignoring and despising God.

The result

is that man stands under the wrath of an angry God. 19 For
Kierkegaard man must pass from immanence to trancendence by means
of the qualitative leap of faith before guilt consciousness becomes
sin consciousness.

The more seriously a man takes his relation-

ship with God, the more conscious he becomes of the "abyss" created
20
by his sin.
For both Kierkegaard and the Coni'essions sin is more

17s~ren Kierkegaard, The Concept of Dread, translated by Walter
Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944), p. 24.

18supra, pp. 48-50.
19supra, p. 17.
20supra, pp. 48-53.

than a ~ere transgression of the law, it is an affront to God.
Kierkegaard's distinction between the guilt consciousness of
i mmanence and the sin consc iousness of Christianity indicates
t hat he would agree with Elert's verdict:

"Reason understands

that there are offenses against God's law, but it is indifferent
to God ' s wrath. 1121
Ignorance of God is an aspect of original sin endorsed by
both the Confessions and Kierkegaard but it is understood differently.

The Confessions term this ignorance "the essence of original

sin" and relate this ignorance to God.

22

Kierkegaard agrees that

sin is i gnorance, but he relates this ignorance to sin.

Here he

is consistent, for he locates sin not in the mind, but in the will.

23

Because of this i gnorance both the Confessions and Kierkegaard agree
that it takes a revelation of God to make sin known.

Thus, although

both positions result in the same conclusion, there is a significant
difference in the method used to reach this conclusion.
A Co~.mon Distinction?

Kierkegaard approaches sin from the point of view of the human
consciousness.

Because he does so, he brir.gs into focus the great

21Elert, The Structure of Lutheranism, p. 32.
22
Supra, p. 18.

23supra, p. 72.
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contrast between what he chooses to call guilt consciousness and
sin consc iousness.

He uses this subjective approach to examine

sin in the r ealm of i mmanent religiosity.

The Confessions interpret

sin from the biblical point of view although a subjective understanding of the experience of sin is not absent.
The question mark behind the heading of this section is there
for good reaso~.

It is suggested that the Confessional distinc-

tion between "civil righteousness" and "spiritual righteousness"
is matched by Kierkegaard's distinction between Religion "A" or
irnmanent religiosity and Religion "B" or paradoxical Christianity.
In Religion "A" Kierkegaard would adroit that reason is at the helm
just as the Confessions acknowledge the place of reason in "civil
righteousness."

Just as the Confessions insist that reason is

out of bounds in relation to "spiritual righteousness" so also
Kierkegaard maintains that paradoxical Christianity is beyond the
province of reason. 24 The parallels are obvious and it appears
valid to equate the Confessional distinction between "civil
righteousness" and "spiritual righteousness" to the distinction
of Kierkegaard between the "religiosity of immanence" and the
paradoxical religiosity of Christianity.
different, but the goal is the same.

The terminology is

Which of these two distinc-

tions, the Confessions' or Kierkegaard's, better accomplishes the
mission will be discussed in the next chapter.

24Supra, p. 32, p. 58.
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Hence it is within the structure of this common distinction that
we cons ider and compare the nature and function of man's free will
or freedom .
Comparison of "Free" Will or "Freedom"
The Confessions allow for the functioning of free will in
the area of " civil r i ght eousness ."

The "free" will is limited,

however, by the things that reason can grasp.

In fact, the

Apology calls "civil righteousness" the righteousness of reason. 2 5
God demands this righteousness.
in society.

It is necessary for law and order

Natural man retains choice in this realm, but often

even here fails to achieve what theoretically could be achieved
if he were a lways sub ject to reason and sound human jud@}llent.
Sin and temptation lead him astra y against his better knowledge.
Thus one dare never predicate a man's potential for "civil
righteousness" merely on the basis of his intellectual capacity. 2 6
Kierkegaard, too, maintains the possibility of choice within
the realm of immanence.

The choice, however, does not refer to

this or that external something, but always to the choice of self •
. Natural man can choose (will) himself.
choice.

Kierkegaard encourages this

He challenges natural man. to follow his reason to the end,

2 5supra

- ' p. 26 , n. 44 .

26Supra.,
p. 26 •

which for Kier kegaard is despair.

Kierkegaard. sees the value of

seriously s eeking God, for only he who seeks seriously will
rea lize despa iringly the "infinite qualitative distinction"
b e tween God a nd man . 2 7
The Confes s ions understand the constructive contribution of
"civil right eousness."

But they also recognize the danger of

"civil r ightec'.isness II becoming confused with the true righteousness
28
of God.
Wherea s Kie r kegaard is certainly aware of the danger
of a r e ligion of i rrunanence supplanting transcendent Christianity

..

he neverthel e ss encourages man to pursue it.

(T'ois may reflect

Kie rkegaard's judgment on the nature of Christianity in his day,
namely, that it had already surrendered to immanence.)

He plays

t h e part of the devil's advocate when he insists that immanence
be followed to its dead end.

Choose despair, he urges, for then

you have a t least the possibility of the eternal open tq you.
It seems Kierkegaard is saying: If you are going to be religious,
get serious about it. 2 9

If this interpretation is accurate, then

he and t he Confessions agree on the importance of "civil righteousness."

However, again the argumentat i'on is different.

Whereas the

Confessions view "civil righteousness" as necessary for law and

2

7Supra , pp. 52, 53.
28
Supra, pp. 28-30.
29 .
Su:ora, p. 51.
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order in the world, Kierkegaard sees the religiosity of immanence
as a penultimate step toward despair and the possibility of true
faith.
Both t he Confessions and Kierkegaard agree that natural man
cannot achieve righteousness before God by an act of his "free"
will.

Man 's will is impotent in spiritual matters.3~ Kierkegaard

categorically ~enies free will because it is not a category of
existence, that is, no one has it!
choose either good or evil.

No one is equally free to

The Confessions deny freedom to the

will in spiritual matters because Scripture denies it.
gaard ' s approach is more philosphical.
infinite categories without antecedents.
them is to reduce them to finitude.

Kierke-

Both sin and freedom are
To attempt- to rationalize

For him the opposite of

freedom is not necessity, but the possibility of guilt.3 1 His
treatment of free will is given in psychological terins but with
a spiritual or religious goal.

While the Confessions and Kierkegaard

agree again in their conclusion on man's spiritual impotence in
his natural state., the process whereby this conclusion was reached·
in the Confessions and by Kierkegaard varies.
The Confessions acknowledge the function of reason in the
achievement of "civil righteousne~s," but they also provide evidence

30
supra, p. 28.

31supra,

pp. 63- 65 •
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that reas on is forever invading the area of "faith-righteousness."
On the contr ary, the more zealously and diligently
t hey wa nt to comprehend these spiritual things with
their r eas o~, t he less t hey understand or believe,
and until t he Holy Spirit enlightens and teaches
t hem they cons ider
all mere foolishness and
fables (F.C. II,9),

1~

Likewise, Kierkegaard limits reason's realm to immanence.
Reason can not even comprehend sin~

It must be revealed by God.

Thus sin consciousness is the distinctive category of Christianity.
Fa ith i s God's miracle.

It begins where "thinking leaves off."

Kierkegaard locates both sin and faith i~ the will.33

The

Conf essions indicate that the Holy Spirit enlightens and teaches
man 's reason.
man's will.

The Confessions view man's reason as antecedent to
Kierkegaard reverses this view and considers will

as a ntecedent to reason.

For Kierkegaard reason's function in

the context of freedom is to lead natural man to an awareness of
reason's finitude in the face of .God's infinitude.3 4
The result of man's "freedom" is dread which anticipates guilt.
Elert's observation on dread in Luther is very similar to Kierkegaard's understanding of dread.35 Despair is the condition of
natural man at the end of his rational tether, and hence he becomes

32supra
_ , p. 28, n. 46.
33supra, pp.
34supra, pp.

72-74.

7~, 75,

35supra, p. 16.
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open to the revelation that God's verdict on human guilt is that
it is sin .

Sin consciousness marks the end of the line for

im.'llanence.

Rationa l and ethical attempts to master God end at

the poi nt where fuith becomes a possibility.

Kierkegaard's

conception of freedom is the very oppos ite of' Y~nt's.

Kant views ·

t he result of ethical s t riving a s progres sion toward ethical
perfecti on.

But Kierkegaard sees the result of such striving

to be the consciousness of gui lt which shows man that salvation
must co~e from a power .greater than he.3 6
Faith
For the Confessions, faith is the result of the Holy Spirit's
invasion of our lives.
trust ·in God.

How?

He moves us to knowledge of, fear of, and

His tools are the means of gra~e, the Word,

Baptism and the Lord's Supper.

The Holy Spirit is the energizing

power t hat liberates the captive human will and enlightens and
empowers it for obedience. 37
For Kierkegaard, faith is paradoxical, an act of the will and

\---·

yet a gift of God.

It is choosing to exist grounded "transparently"

in our creator God.

It is acknowledging our self as a self before

.

God and Christ, with Christ being the measure of our self'.

36
supra,

pp.

65, 66.

37supra, p. 32.

.

Faith

focus es in t he Paradox of Jesus Christ, the God-man, the ~ternal
in t ime.

The Atonement calls man either to faith or to offence.

For both the Confessions and for Kierkegaard, faith marks the
beginning of new life or existence.
in f a ith, for f a ith bridges the

11

Authentic existence is grounded

abyss 11 and faith recognizes the

eternal va lidity of the self. 38
· The Confe ssions acknowledge what might be called faith's
ambiva l ence.
givenes s.

It is a life characterized by repentance and for-

It is also a life engaged in struggle, a warfare of

t he f l esh against the Spirit. 39 Similarly, in Kierkegaard,
f a ith involves man in t ension and struggle.

Repentance is a

necessary consequence of faith and is viewed as a reaffinnation
of t he self as sinner before God, yet as a forgiven sinner in
~hrist. 40 Agai~, although the terfilinology and reasoning.varies,
t here is a remarkable similarity in the dynamic view of the
Christian lif e taken by both the Confessions and Kierkegaard.
Observations
This writer hesitates to title this section "observations"
lest someone quip that this study is now reduced to making

38supra, pp.

74-76.

39supra, pp.

33, 34.

40Sunra,

p.

76. ·
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observations about observations.

However, for want of a better

term and in view of the need ~o point up a few significant
discoveries t his section is necessary.
In general, it is reassuring to note the great similarity
between the Confessions ·and Kierkegaard in the conclusions reached
on the subject of free will.

This is particularly significant

since these co1~clusions were obtained by different methodologies.
The Confessional approach is deductive whereas Kierkegaard's
approach was inductive.

In this writer's opinion the Confessional

position based on the authority of Scripture is complemented by
Kierkegaard's conclusions reached by introspection and induction.
The fact that both the Confessions and Kierkegaard reach similar
conclusions by variant methods is indicative of the validity of
the position.

Perhaps such agreement should not surprise us since

both. the Confessions and Kierkegaard were attempting to achieve
the same goal.
However, there is a decisive difference between the Confessional
understanding of the Fall and that of Kierkegaard.

The implica-

tions of this difference are reflected in Kierkegaard's concept
of human freedom.

The crux of the matter appears to be Kierkegaard's

unwi~lingness to adroit that man sins from necessity.

For

Kierkegaard the biological category of birth does not transmit
the spiritual determinant of sin.

When Kierkegaard assents to

the Confessional statement that "hereditary sin is so deep and
dreadful a corruption of nature that it cannot be understood by

100

the reas on of any man but must be recognized and believed by the
reve lation of Scri pture , 1141 he appea rs to be either reinterpreting
he r editary s i n or accepting only the latter half of this Confessional aff innat ion.

Thus, one is faced with this question:

Does

accepting t he Conf essi onal position on original sin compel one to
b elieve that man sins of necessity because of the corruption of
h is nature?

Kterkegaard would say no.

He have nowhere been chargeable with the foolishness
of thi nking t hat man must sin; on the contrary, we have
everywher e prot ested a gainst every sort of merely
exper imenta l knowledge, and have said, what we here
again repeat, that sin presupposes itself, just as
f r eedom does and ca nnot be exp1t~ned, any more than
freedom can, by any antecedent.
The signi f ica nce of. this difference between Kierkegaard and
t he Confess ions will be considered in chapter five.
One fina l ob servation is on order before we move on to the
next chapter.

The Confessions attempt to distinguish between "civil

righteousness" and "spiritual righteousness" without complete
succes·s .

43

There can be no doubt about the sincerity of the men

who sought to make this distinction plain and unambiguous, for
much of their argument hinged on the validity of this distinction.
By analogy Kierkegaard also made a distinction between the

4

1supra, p. 89.

42Kierkegaard, The Concept of Dread, p. 100.

43 ~ , p. 113.
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the "religiosity of immanence" as opposed to the "religiosity of
paradoxical Christianity."

The Confessional categories are

rational wher eas Kie.r kegaard 's are existential.

Which can best

carry_the f reight is t he question to be examined also in the next
chapter.

,.

CHAPl'ER V

FINAL EVALUATION
The work of the theologian, then is to describe the
workings of faith, and to do so in faith's own terms;
for wi thout a knowledge of justifying faith, in
Dr. Pieper's word, the Bible remains "a book locked
with s even seals. 111
"Evaluation" is a difficult task.

Objectivity is obviously called

for, and yet some subjectivity is inevitable.

Nevertheless this chap-

ter is necessary to "knot the thread" and to point to areas for
further study.
. A Corrective?
Both the Confessions and Kierkegaard attempt a "corrective" when
presenting their positions on "free" will.

Both the Confessions and

Kierkegaard sought to correct the over-rating of reason in man's
coming into relationship with God.

A corrective assumes that the

right position does exist, but that deviation has occurred.

The

question we must ask in view of the above is: Do we need a corrective?
To answer this question we must ask others.

Can we entirely es-

cnpe rationalism, immanence, and nominal orthodoxy? Does our Synod's
position in regard to "free" will faithfully reflect the Confessional

1Jaroslav Pelikan, From Luther to Kierke aard: A Stud in the
History of Theology (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1950,
p. 12.
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position?

Do the current doctrinal formulations of the Lutheran

Church-~Mi s souri Synod make use of the insights of Kierkegaard in
the area of "free" will?

Can current Lutheran theological formula-

tions continue to utilize Aristotelian philosophy as the vehicle for
self-expr ession?
Under st andi ng theology is more than a matter of the mind.

Pinomaa

says of Luther:
To Luther t heology was a matter of the heart and not of
the :i.nt ell ect. From the beginning of his theologic al
endeavor he valued experience very highly. He who has
not experienced temptation and affli ction, what does he
know? Here we have one of the diffi cult problems of
Luther ' s theology : he insists on an experiential basis
of faith , yet takes a stand against natural human feelings.
Faith' s e xperience of reality does not stem from natural
hu.~an feelings but contradicts them. The saving reality
of Christ and faith in him are in contradiction to everything t hat natural man can experience on his own. They
have to do with the reality of God, which is beyond human
r eason .2
In view of Luther's understanding of theology and the difficulties
it presents to systematic theology it is not surpri~ing that Lutheran
Confessional theology turned to Melanchthon's methodology.

Pelikan

observes that CfJ.emnitz repudiated some of "Melanchthon's theological
vagaries, " but the "philosophy and dialectic _o f Melanchthon retained
its control of Lutheran theological formulation even after 15TI." The
fact that Melanchthonian philosophy prevailed even after Melanchthonian
theology had gone down in defeat is one of the ironies in the history

2:r.ennart Pinomaa, Faith Victorious, translated by Walter Kukkonen
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1963), p. 79.
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of Lutheran theology.

"Even the Lutheran Confessions kept Melanchthon's

Philosophical framework almost intact. 113 The men who composed the
Formula, for example, were trained in "Aristotelian philosophy as
developed by Melanchthon. 114 Finally Pelikan observes:'

"Thus

Melanchthonianism was repudiated theologically, but by the work of
Chemnitz was saved philosophically."5 Even to this day, the Aristotelian philosophical influence is apparent in Lutheran theological
6
formulation.
If Aristotelian philosophy has served adequately as the framework
and vehicle for Lutheran theology why call it into question now?
has it served adequately? Pelikan observed:
One by one, Kant's Critique does away with the elaborate
proofs for the existence of God which Lutheran Aristotelianism shared with medieval scholasticism. For this
fact, scholasticism has never forgiven Kant, and neither
has Rationalism. But Lutheran theology can be grateful
to him for freeing it from the onerous responsibility of
proving by means of reason that which is known by faith
through the forgiveness of God in the Cross of Jesus Christ.
Th~, by proving "that all attempts to establish a
theology by the aid of speculation alone are fruitless,
that the principles of reason as applied to nature do not
conduct to any theological truths, and, consequently,
that a rational theology can have no existence," Kant

3Pelikan, From Luther to Kierkegaard, pp.

4Ibid.,

p.

46, 47.

47.

5Ibid., p. 48.

-

6
Francis Pieper, Christian Dogmatics (St. Louis: Concordia
Publishing House, 1950), I, II, III, passim.
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made possible a reconstruction of the subject matter
and method of theology that could have cleared the way
for a recovery- of Luther's understanding of the nature
of f aith.7
Unfortunat ely, as Pelikan also notes, Luthern theology did not
do t his.

Thus, still today we are lef't with an Aristotelian method-

olgy which is hardly adequate to express Lutheran theology.
Kierkegaard act as a corrective on our methodology?

Can

Can he provide a

philosophy less alien to our theology, one which will express the
ba sic truths of the Christian faith without rationalistic distortion?
Pelikan answers:
But i f the new philosophy was to do more than to give up
one s peculative system in favor of another, it had to be
r el ated to t he basic structure of Lutheran theology and
root ed in fai th. The only philosophical framework in
which Lutheran theology could be recast had to be a :framework derived from that t heology itself. It is this circumstance that gives meaning and relevance to the philosophy
of S~ren Kierkegaard. Kierkegaard is the first Christian
philosopher to develop a critical philosophy in the truest
and most complete sense o:f the word. He is, therefore, the
cli max of the development we have traced in this study. In
him Lutheranism produced a philosopher whose thought has
brought on a revolution in both theology and philosophy.
But the revolution has made possible a recovery- of the
8
deep evangelical insights o:f the theology of Martin Luther.
Perhaps we could admit the need o:f a corrective to current
Lutheran theological methodology.

The existentiali st :framework would

then become the vehicle for theological expression.

But is this

7Pelikan, From Luther To Kierkegaard, pp. 92, 93.
8
rbid., pp. 113, 114.
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possible? Kierkegaard himself said that "an existential system" was
impossible.

If we look to Kierkegaard for a ready-made system we shall.

be disappointed.

In fact, Lutheran theology

all his insights uncritically.

may

not be able to accept

He, too, has some missing links which

should not be surprising since he viewed his work as a "corrective."
Pelikan observes:
From what has been said here, as well as in our first
chapter, we can draw the conclusion that the existential
philosophy of S~ren Kierkegaard performed a great service
toward a solution of the problem of a philosophy for
Lutheran theology. The ~any affinities between his point
of view and Luther's theology suggest that contemporary
Lutheran theology could do much worse than to look more
deeply into Kierkegaard for the categories in which to
articuJ.ate its faith. This is not to say that theology
can accept him uncritically; for his opposition to
"systems" and "schools" would make such uncritical acceptance a violation of his own ideas. There are several
blind spots in his thought, notably the individualism
and subjectivism which have prevented most of his followers
from articulating an adequate doctrine of the Church. But
when compared with the other philosophies to which Lutheran
theology has been linked, Kierkegaard's philosophy has much
to say to Lutheran theology.9
·
In chapter four it was pointed out that Kierkegaard and the
Confessions often agreed in their conclusions, but disagreed in the
methods used to arrive at an identical conclusion.

It appears to

this writer that Kierkegaard's methodology with its existentialist
categories could well serve both as a corrective and as a complement
to current Luthe~an theological methodology.

To fail to utilize the

insights of Kierkegaard where they are in hannony with Scripture and

9Ibid., p. 118.
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our Confessions would be Lutheran theology's loss.

But what of those

instances where they seemingly do not agree?
The Implications of Kierkegaard's View of the Fall.
To accurately analyze Kierkegaard's position on the Fall it is
necessary to trace his theological and philosophic development in
greater detail than was done in chapter three.

The distinctions

Kierkegaard makes will enable us to evaluate his position regarding
the Fall fairly.
We must first ask:

What is the relationship of the individual

to the human race? What is· Adam's relationship to humanity?
Kierkegaard ans,:1ers:
To explain Adam's sin is therefore to explain original
sin and no explanation is of any avail which explains
original sin and does not explain Adam. The deep~st
reason for this is to be discovered in the essential
characteristic of human existence, that man is an
individual and as such is at once himself and the whole
race, in such wise that the whole race has part in the
individual, and the individual has part in the whole race.
If one does not hold fast to this, one either gets into
the singularity of Pelagianism, Sociniani.sm, or
philanthropy, or else falls into the fantastic. 9a
One frequent criticism of Kierkegaard is his failure to sense
the need for community, yet here he emphasizes the corporate nature
of man's involvement in humanity.
part of the human race.
recognize this fact.

Adam was a man and as such is a

Any explanation of original sin must seriously

But

9as~ren Kierkegaard, The Concept of Dread, translated by Walter
Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944), p. 26.
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According to traditional conceptions, the difference
between Adem Is first sin and the first sin of every
man is this: Adam's sin conditions sinfulness as a
consequence; the other first sin assumes sinfulness
as a condition. If that were so, then Adam would
really be outside the race, and the race did not begin
with him but had a beginning outside i tself, and this
runs contrary to every concept. 10
We agree that Kierkegaard has correct ly summarized the traditional view of the Fall.

But the alternative he suggests poses a

problem even though it may solve the problem of keeping Adam wit~in
the race.

Kierkegaard's position must predicate a state of innocence

analogous to Adam's of every man, and this is something Lutheran
theology would be reluctant to admit.

But what is this "innocence?"

For Kierkegaard "innocence is not a perfection one ought to wish
to recover."

Innocence is rather ignorance of the evil. 11 This is

what Adam lost, and in Kierkegaard's opinion man loses this innocence
with his first sin.

How?

As Adrun lost innocence by guilt, so does every man lose
it. If it was not by guilt he lost it, neither was it
innocence he lost; and if he was not innocent before he
became guilty, he never became guilty • • • •
But only by guilt is innocence lost; every man loses innocence in essentially the same way- that Adam did, and it is
not in the interest of ethics to represent all men as
troubled and interested spectators of' guilt·, but not guilty,
nor is it to the interest of dogmatics to represent al1
as interested and sympathetic spectators of redemption, but
not redeemed.12

lOibid., p. 27.
11
Ibid., p. 34.
12Ib.d

-2:....·, pp. 32, 33.
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It seems that Kierkegaard is saying that it takes our first
conscious sin to convince us subjectively of our involvement in the
Fall.

So, too, like Adam we bring sin into the world through our sin.
With the first sin crone sin into the world. Exactly in
the same way i s this true of every subsequent first sin
of man, that with it sin comes into t he world. The fact
t hat it wa s not t here before Adam' s f i rst sin i s (in
relation to sin itself) an altogethe r accidental and
irrelevant reflecti on which has alt ogether no significance,
and is no justificat i on for rnaktng Ao.a-r s sin greater or
the first sin of every other man l ess .

3

Ki erkegaard points out i n a footnote that the point of his
r easoni ng here is to "get J\d;;un back into -che human race, exactly
in the same sense in which every other individual is."

This, he

f urther points out, theologians ought to look after especially in view
of the Atonement.14
Objectively·, Kierkegaard acknowledges the reality of inherited
s i n.

His position is clarified by the following:
It i s quite true that every man can say with profound
seriousness that he was born in misery and his mother
conceived him in sin; but really he can only sorrow
rightly over it when he himself has brought guilt into
the wor ld and brought all this upon , himself, for it is
a contradiction to want to sorrow aesthetically over sinf'ulness. T'ne only one who innocently sorrowed over ~
s i nf'ulness ·was Christ, but He did not sorrow over it

l3Ibid., p. 28.
14rbid., p. 30.
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as a destiny which He must put up with, but He sorrowed
a s one who freely chose to bear all the sin of the world
and to suffer its punishment.15
Kierkegaard views sinfulness as a quantitative thing whereas
he views the Fall or the first sin as a qualitative thing because
it alters man's existence and his understanding of it.

He, therefore,

can claim:
In the for~going I have several times called attention
to the fact that the v i ew presented in thi s work does not
deny the prope.gation of sinfulness through generation,
or in other wor ds that sinfulness has its history in the
fact of generation; I have only said that sinfulness moves
by quantitative determi nants, whereas sin comes in ~onstantly by the qualitative leap of the individua1.l6
For Kierkegaard, sin and freedom are transcendent categories.
Si n entered into man by dread and in turn brought dread vith it.
Dread for Kierkegaard was the primary category, an alien power vhich
lays hold on an individual and renders him impotent.
fear what he desires and desire what he fears.
sin always occurs in impotence.

It makes him

Hence, the first

It would seem then that man could

not be held accountable, but he is, and this very disregard of
accountability is what ensnares him. 17 Kierkegaard seeks to guard
and buttress individual. accountability with his position.

15rb1d., p. 35.
16 .
~., p. 42.
17
Ibid., p. 45, 47.
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How does this understanding of the qualitative Fall or first
sin and the subsequent quantitive sinf'ulness affect Kierkegaard's
view of human freedom?
antecedent.

Much, for "freedom, 11 too, is a concept without

Ki~rkegaard asserts that the distinction "between good

and evil certainly exists for freedom," but always in concrete form.
This is misunderstood when freedom is made an object of thought.
No one, he affirms, makes the choice between good and evil without
being at the moment of choice in either one or the other position. 18
Thus it appears that Kierkegaard's understanding of the Fall and
its consequences are not as radical a departure from traditional
Christianity as it at first ~ay have seemed to some.

He makes a

disttnction between the objective significance of the Fall of Adam
and our subjective apprehension of its significance.

On the other

hand, the Lutheran Confessions do not stress the subjective apprehension of the Fall in the same manner.
Ultimately, both Kierkegaard and the Confessions include all
men in the category of spiritual impotence apart from God's grace.
So in spite of a difference of method both Kierkegaard and the
Confessions reach the same conclusion.

1 8:rbid., p. 99.
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Some Implications for Systematic Theology
At the beginning of this chapter it was noted thnt the task of
theology was to describe "the workings of faith" in faith's own
terms.

In the foregoing we have noted how Pelikan viewed Kierkegaard's

pot ential contribution to Lutheran theological formulation.

In the

pr evious section we observed that Kierkegaard's view of the Fall may
not be at odds with the Confessions' understanding because of his
distinction between the objective Fall and our subjective perception
of our Fall.

In view of the foregoing we might be predisposed to

favor existence categories for systematic theology's descriptive
t ask.

But Kierkegaard himself has observed that an "existential

system" is impossible.

Without a system the systematic theologian's

work will be confusing at best.
revise its outlook on systems.

Perhaps Lutheran theology needs to
Luther himself said: "To have God,

you see, does not mean to lay hands upon him, or to put Him into
a purse, or shut him up in a chest" (L.C. I,13).

19

What significance does Kierkegaard's methodology and insights
into "free" will provide for systematic theology.

Heinecken observes

that Kierkegaard's existential categories mean:
That there shall be an end of the wrong kind of systembuilding, precisely: · the end of that to which Luther
objected. There can be no fixed system of doctrine,
fixed and formulated for all times. But there must be

19The Book of Concord, translated and edited by Theodore G.
Tappert (Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press., 1959), p. 366.
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the perpetuation of tl1ose categori es ~-rhich require the
i nner transfonnation. How at any gi ven time this shall
be done cannot be stated in advance. T'nis is the constant
t a sk of systematic theology: to fonnulate the credo for
today in opposition to alternatives, to do what"'tFie New
Testament does, to witness to the 11 event" which constitutes
the center of both history and the fulness of time and to
do it precisely in the tenns of each todey. Kierkegaard
did it for his dey, and I think we are still a part of
hi s day.20
If we accept Heinecken's judgment, the task for . systematic
theology becomes a challenging one, indeed.
is the sunnnons to relevance.

Implicit in this chal.lenge

To be relevant, we need to conmrunicate.

Here, Kierkegaard can help us with his emphasis on the "how" of
.

Christian faith.

.

Perhaps in the past the "what" of the Christian

faith has been emphasized in Lutheran theology at the expense of the
"how."
Comnrunication of spiritual realities is at best difficult.

We

previously noted that sincere attempt of the Confessions to draw a
tight distinction between outward performance in achieving "civil
righteousness" and true inward realization in "spiritual righteousness."

Bonhoe.f fer suggests that either these categories are clumsy

or the distinction cannot be so neatly drawn.
The first step. must be regarded to start with as an
external work, which effects the change from one existence to another. It is a step within everybody's
capacity, for it lies within the limits of human freedom.

2~rtin J. Heinecken, The Moment Before God (Philadelphia:
Muhlenberg Press, 1956), p. 382.

114

I t is an act within the sphere of the natural la..,, (.justitia
c ivilis) and in that sphere man is free. Although Peter
cannot achieve his cnm conversion, he can leave his father's
nets . In the gospels the very first step a man must take
:.s an act vhich radically affects his whole existence. The
; man Catholic Church demanded this step as an extraordinary
,ossibility which only monks could achieve, while the rest
of the faithful must content themselves with an uncondit i onal submission to the Church and its ordinances. The
Lutheran conf essions also significantly recognize the first
st ep. Having dealt effectively with the danger of Pelagianism,
t hey find it both possible and necessary to leave room for the
f irst external act which is the essential preliminary to
faith. This step there takes the form of an invitation to
come to the Church where the wrd of salvation is proclaimed.
To take this step it is not necessary to surrender one's
f r eedom. Come to Church! You can do that of your own free
will. You can leave your home on a Sunday morning and come
t o hear the sermon. If you 'Will not, you are of your own
free will excluding yourself from the place where faith
i s a possibility. Thus the Lutheran confessions show their
awar eness of a situation where faith is a possibility, and of
a situation where it is not. Admittedly they tend to softpedal it as though they were almost ashamed of it. But
t here it is, and it shows that they are just as aware as
the gospels of the importance of the first external step. 21
Kierkegaard likewise recognizes the "choice" that Bonhoeffer is
poi nting up here with his distinction between the religion of immanence
and paradoxical Christianity.

The difference is that he does it

without apology or any attempt to "soft-pedal" the need for this
choi ce.

The Confessions also had difficulty communicating the nature

of the "image of God." A "di m spark" is for some a quantitive term.
I s not man's relationship to God that of a derived and dependent being?
I s not the image of God more clearly understood when described as

21
Dietrich Bonhoeffer, The Cost of Discipleshi}, translated by
R.H. Fuller (New York: The macmillan Company, 1958. p. 57.
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man's reflexive nature received from God by grace, perceived by faith
and expressed by trust and obedience? Is it not dangerous to speak
of the "image of God" as something concreated in man as though it were
his possession?

It seems to leave the gate open for pantheistic or

idealistic deification of man with its imagery of the "Divine Spark."
If Lutheran theology is to communicate meaningfully, it must
use categories with which people can relate.

As an example contrast

the two following quotations on the nature of man.
Man, created by God, is placed in the Garden, and cormna.nded
"to dress and keep it" (Gen. 2:15). He is given power and
authorHy over the beasts of the field, but he is solemnly
forbidden to eat "of the tree of the knowledge or good and
evil" (Gen. 2:17). Man's powers, according to the Biblical
r evelation, are conferred and bestowed: they are neither
a bsolute nor original. Man's relation to God is one of
creaturely dependence, in which he enjoys delegated authority;
and, as a created being, he is called to live in trust and
obedience. He is called to respond to fatherly goodness
wit h filial trust: to grace with faith. Consequently, he
is called to recognize and confess that the true center
of his life is not within himself but beyond himself. ~he
Biblical story is the record of the destruction of this
relationship by willful self-assertion and rebellion. The
result is man's undoing, and the experience of God's love
as wrath.22
This quotation reflects existence categories, whereas the following citation uses scholastic terminology.
The divine image, that is, the true knowledge of God and
the confonnity of the human will to the will of God, was
not subsequently and externally added to man at creation,
as the Papists contend, who regard the divine image

22stuart Barton Babbage, Man In Nature and In Grace (Grand Rapids:
Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1957), p. 16.
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(holiness and righteousness) as a donum superadditum, a
superadded gift . Rather was man created with the divine
i mage, as Gen. 1:26 shows: "Let us make man in Our image.,
a f'ter Our Likeness." The divine image was a donum
concreatum, donum naturale., donum intrinsecum-:----ft' follows
that now, af'ter the Fall, the human nature is no longer
perf ect (natura integra or in puris naturalibus)., as the
Papists and modern theologians and philosophers teach, but
thor oughly and in its innennost parts corrupt (natura
corrunt a , na.tura sauciata). , It is true, the iustitia
ori ginalis did not constitute the nature of man. Even
after the Fall, man is still c?/Gpwrr<2s (Rom. 5:12),
inasmuch a s the original righteousness was not t~~ substance,
but a non-essential attribute or acc i dent • • • •
The danger impli cit in the scholastic method and tenninology is
i t s hidden rationali sm.

In Lutheran theol ogy we may strive to define

t he r elationship between the two natures of Christ until at the end
of t he study of the "Genus Apotelesmatic1l'll

11

we have forgotten the

mystery and the paradox of the God-man, J esus Christ.

24

Kierkegaard

noted that once we feel we comprehend something we feel at the same
time we have mastered it.

Subtle, indeed, is the appeal to pride in

the present framework of Lutheran theology.
Hei necken opserves:
Luther ma.de the God-relationshio in Christ a matter of
Word alone 'Without "objective" guarantees, as., e.g.,
r eason, t he church. This is what Kierkegaard too is
asserting . It is possible to live in Aristotelian
categories, it is possible to l i ve in ethical categories,
but this must not be confused with Christianity.· Both
Luther and Kierkegaard, therefore, removed Christianity
from the area of speculation and put it where it belongs,

23Pieper, Dogmatics, I, 521.
24
Cf. James 1:23,24.
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im Sitz des Lebens--in the midst of life--where the
battles must be fought. Both of them were concerned
to let God be God, to take seriously the Triune God,
not to discar d Pentecost, to make sure that a man was
not li vin~ af!;cr all after the flesh instead of in
a.ccordo.nce with the Gpirit, glorying in his own wisdom
and the feeling that he was a devil of a cleyer fellow
to recosnize the true God when he was confronted by him. 25
If

we

seek seriously to utilize Kierkegaard's contribution to

Lutheran theology it will mean that systematic theology will have to
address itself to the whole man, and not just to man's intellect.
Systematic theology must confront the whole man with God's claim upon
him as a creature and God's gift to Him in Christ.

Psychiatry today

is recognizing man's fragmented condition as a cau~e of his spiritual
dissolution.

Paul Tournier in his book, The Whole Person in a Broken

1-!orld, appeals to the churches to speak w:i. th relevance to man's
spiritual need.

His thesis is that the repressed spiritual conscious-

ness of man today is responsible for the "neurosis of defiance" that
characterizes our age.

He condemns the churches for withdrawing from

the real battles of life, and one of the methods of this withdrawal
26
is the intellectualizing of the Christian f aith.
Kierkegaard like Luther leaves behind no completed system.

He

poses problems, a few of which are the ·relation of thought to existence,
of reason to faith, of nature to grace, of inunanence to transcendence.

2 5Heinecken, The Moment Before God, p. 352.
26Paul To~ier, The vlhole Person in a Broken World, translated by
John and Helen Doberstein (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1947),
passim.
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Can these be viewed as co-ordinates or must they be held in tension?
Can they be synthesized as they were in Thomistic scholasticism or
must they, as Luther seems to indicate, remain in irreconcilable
tension and opposition? But isn't this the business of systematic
theology.? This study too poses questions and fails to answer them.
Perhaps it is the destiny of systematic theology always to have more
questions than answers.

The experience of not being able to ansver

is a humbling one, a reminder that God remains God and that His fool•
ishness is wiser than our wisdom.
All who involve themselves in the task of systematic theology
are also sinners.

We too might well pray with Kierkegaard:

Father in heaven, to Thee the congregation of'ten makes
its petition for all who are sick and sorrowful, and
when someone amongst us lies ill, alas of mortal sickness the congregation sometimes desires a special petition; Grant that we may each one of us become in good
time aware what sickness it is ,-1hich is the sickness unto
death, and aware that we are al.l of us suffering from
this sickness. O Lord Jesus Christ, who didst come to
earth to heal them that suffer from this sickness, from
which, alas, we all suffer, but from which Thou are able
to heal only those who are conscious that they are sick in
this way; help Thou us in this sickness to hold fast to
Thee, to the end that we may be healed of it. 0 God the
Holy Ghost, who comest to help us in this sickness if we
honestly desire to be healed; remain with us so that for
no single instant we may to our own destruction shun the
Physician, but may remain with Him--delivered from sickness.
For to be with Him is to be delivered from our sickn ,s and
when we are with Him we are saved from all sickness. 2

2 7s~ren Kierkegaard, Fear And Trembling and The Sickness Unto Death,
transla~ed by Walter Lowrie, Doubleday Anchor Books (Garden City, New
York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1941), pp. 133, 134.
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